Culturalism and the rise of the Islamic State: faith, sectarianism and violence

Abstract

This paper looks at the ways in which culturalist discourses have influenced our understanding and representation of the rise of the so-called Islamic State. It argues that, in keeping with older narratives on the motives of "bad" Muslims, its political and economic objectives have been overlooked and/or downplayed. Instead, I propose, there has been a strategically efficacious focus on its appeal to Islam, on its sectarian rhetoric and on its use of violence. By continuing to emphasise the ethical over the political in these ways, the culturalism that underpins the dominant representation of the Islamic State's emergence has, I conclude, served three key purposes-the mobilisation of the "good" Muslim, the exculpation of Western foreign policy and the legitimisation of force.

Tripartheid: How Sectarianism Became Internal to Being in Anbar, Iraq

“…I bolster Tim Jacoby's (, ) intervention that reading too much “Islam” into analysis of geo‐politics is blinding to what Sunnism has come to actually mean on the ground. Fassihi (), Al‐Mohammad (), and Tatar () describe national social entanglements loosening in Iraq, but each argue that other entanglements tightened as tribes, sectarian and nonsectarian groups, and gangs mobilized in the vacuum of power left after Saddam's regime.…”

Beyond the beyond(s): On the (many) third way(s) beyond primordialism and instrumentalism in the study of sectarianism

“…Thus, to primordialists, the underlying key drivers of sectarianism are supposed to be doctrinal differences between Shia and Sunni Islam. A concept very often referred to in presentations of the primordialist position (e.g., Colgan, ; Hashemi & Postel, ; Jacoby, ; Jacoby & Neggaz, ; Matthiesen et al, ; Phillips, ; Salloukh, ; Wehrey, ) is “ancient hatred”, which according to primordialists, we are told, is so deeply embedded in the collective beliefs of the members of these societies that it overshadows other possible sources of identity or conflict.…”

“…Hashemi and Postel (: 2), for instance, argue that the former American president is “one of the most prominent proponents of this (primordialist) view.” They substantiate this by pointing to his remarks about how the Syrian conflict is about “ancient sectarian differences … rooted in conflicts that date back millennia.” This is a quote often used when the primordialist argument needs to be illustrated (e.g., Salloukh, : 35; Nasr, : 77; Wehrey, : 5; Byman, : 79). In addition to politicians, Western journalists and commentators are regularly also highlighted when statements about the prominence of primordialism are underpinned (Jacoby, ). Here, Thomas Friedman () figures very prominently, often with reference to his assertion that “the main issue (in the Yemeni conflict) is the seventh century struggle over who is the rightful heir to the Prophet Muhammad—Shiites or Sunnis” (e.g., Dixon, : 15; Haddad, : 21; Hashemi & Postel, : 3).…”

“…From a Foucauldian perspective, sectarianism has, for instance, been analysed as a “socioeconomic and political power that produces and reproduces sectarian subjects and modes of political subjectification and mobilization through a dispersed ensemble of institutional, clientelist and discoursive practices” (Salloukh, Barakat, al‐Habbal, Khattab, & Mikaelian, ). Another example is the so‐called “Copenhagen School of Securitization” from IR Theory, which according to Helle Malmvig (2015: 32; see also Darwich & Fakhoury, ; Mabon, ; Saleh & Kraetzschmar, ) is attractive because it “will allow us to bridge concerns with the power politics involved when regional actors and local elites make sectarian claims and the processes of social construction whereby sectarian identities are enacted and discursively framed as security threats.” Edward Said has, furthermore, been introduced as a lens to examine how Western representations of sectarianism in the Middle East draws on classic orientalist tropes and how this impact not only Western understandings but also policies towards so‐called “sectarian conflicts” in the Middle East (Jacoby, ).…”

Shia-sunnisekterisme til debat i et nyt Mellemøsten

“…Gennem de seneste år har denne første strategi udmøntet sig i en import af en lang raekke potentielle "nye frelsere". De taeller bredere teoretiske strømninger som konstruktivisme, historisk sociologi, etnosymbolisme, kritisk raceteori og Københavner-skolens sikkerhedsliggørelsesteori såvel som mere specifikke teoretikere såsom Michel Foucault, Edward Said, Pierre Bourdieu og Alexandra Sommer (Dodge 2018a;Jacoby 2017;Phillips 2015;Gaiser 2017;Malmvig 2015;Haddad 2011).…”