Culture and Institutions

Alesina, Alberto; Giuliano, Paola

doi:10.1257/jel.53.4.898

Cited by 1,189 publications

(689 citation statements)

References 183 publications

(202 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

654

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Examples include family, economy, education, religion, property rights, and democratic institutions. A growing number of studies show that social norms can define the success of establishment and the direction of evolution of various social institutions (52,53). As a result, the same institutions may function differently in different cultures.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As a result, the same institutions may function differently in different cultures. Simultaneously, social institutions affect the development or nature of norms and other cultural traits (53). Building a predictive theory of social institutions is hardly possible without explicitly considering an evolved human ability to internalize social norms.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Collective action and the evolution of social norm internalization

Gavrilets

Richerson

2017

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

222

159

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Human behavior is strongly affected by culturally transmitted norms and values. Certain norms are internalized (i.e., acting according to a norm becomes an end in itself rather than merely a tool in achieving certain goals or avoiding social sanctions). Humans' capacity to internalize norms likely evolved in our ancestors to simplify solving certain challenges-including social ones. Here we study theoretically the evolutionary origins of the capacity to internalize norms. In our models, individuals can choose to participate in collective actions as well as punish free riders. In making their decisions, individuals attempt to maximize a utility function in which normative values are initially irrelevant but play an increasingly important role if the ability to internalize norms emerges. Using agent-based simulations, we show that norm internalization evolves under a wide range of conditions so that cooperation becomes "instinctive." Norm internalization evolves much more easily and has much larger effects on behavior if groups promote peer punishment of free riders. Promoting only participation in collective actions is not effective. Typically, intermediate levels of norm internalization are most frequent but there are also cases with relatively small frequencies of "oversocialized" individuals willing to make extreme sacrifices for their groups no matter material costs, as well as "undersocialized" individuals completely immune to social norms. Evolving the ability to internalize norms was likely a crucial step on the path to large-scale human cooperation.H uman social behavior is controlled by many interacting factors including material cost-benefit considerations, genetically informed social instincts, personality, and culturally transmitted norms, values, and institutions (1-5). A social norm is a behavior that one is expected to follow and expects others to follow in a given social situation (6, 7). Humans learn norms from parents, through educational and religious practices, and from friends and acquaintances, books, and media. The adherence to norms is socially reinforced by the approval of, and rewards to, individuals who follow them and punishment of norm violators. Certain norms are internalized, that is, acting according to a norm becomes an end in itself rather than merely a tool in achieving certain goals or avoiding social sanctions (1, 2, 8-11). For individuals who have strongly internalized a norm, violating it is psychologically painful even if the direct material benefits for the violation are positive. Many individuals and groups are willing to pay extremely high costs to enact, defend, or promulgate norms that they consider important (12). At the same time, virtually all norms can be violated by individuals under some conditions (e.g., if the costs of compliance are too high). Norms thus can be viewed as one of the arguments in the utility function that each individual maximizes (9).Internalizing a norm has two significant effects upon human behavior: People who have internalized a norm follow...

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Collective action and the evolution of social norm internalization

Gavrilets

Richerson

2017

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

222

159

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…As such, this contribution can be placed in the context of a growing literature examining the effect of different cultural dimensions on governance and economic development (for a review, see Alesina and Giuliano 2014). My empirical results are revealing.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 85%

Individualism–collectivism, governance and economic development

Kyriacou

2016

European Journal of Political Economy

101

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

While an individualist society prizes personal control, autonomy and individual accomplishments, a collectivist society puts a premium on loyalty and cohesion and imposes mutual obligations in the context of in-groups. It has been argued that individualism will promote economic development directly by sharpening individual incentives to invest, innovate and accumulate wealth. In this article, I argue that the individualist-collectivist dimension can also affect development through its impact on governance. The in-group favoritism inherent to collectivist societies is likely to engender corruption, nepotism and clientelism in the public sphere. In individualist societies, the relative weakness of in-group pressures and an emphasis on personal achievement and worth will contribute towards a more meritocratic and efficient public sector. My empirical evidence confirms the strong positive relationship between individualism and government quality. Moreover, I provide robust empirical evidence showing that the expected direct positive impact of individualism on economic development disappears when additionally controlling for governance, a finding which suggests that insofar as individualism affects development it does so because it promotes good governance.

show abstract

“…In their review, Alesina and Giuliano (2015) note the existence of a two-way causal relationship between culture and institutions. More specifically, using secondary data from various sources, Holmes, Miller, Hitt and Salmador (2013) show that informal institutions (e.g.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Methodological Issues in Studying Cultural Dimensions with Special Reference to Educational Context

Alshahrani

2017

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The aim of this review was to evaluate certain methodological issues related to the measurement of cultural dimensions and their effects with special reference to educational contexts. Using Google Scholar with the exact topics as search terms, 50 research reports were obtained. The results obtained from the critical analysis of the methodologies used in these reports are discussed in this review. Most studies were on power distance and individualism/collectivism dimensions of culture. A large number of conceptual frameworks and as many as 121 measurement instruments have been proposed by different workers. Research approach in any particular study is determined by the framework and the instrument chosen or self-developed instruments. Surveys and interviews are more commonly used. Not estimating internal consistency or reliability tests in some works makes it difficult to judge the validity of the method of data analysis. Generally the sample size is in the range of 200-500 participants in surveys. Small sample sizes used in a few works may affect the validity and applicability of their findings. It is concluded that large groups of scientists doing a common research programme across several countries is better than individual researches. Meta-analyses are also superior to individual researches. Such methods ensure validity and replicability of the findings. Although none of the research used scenario analysis, it is also a promising method.

show abstract

Culture and Institutions

Cited by 1,189 publications

References 183 publications

Collective action and the evolution of social norm internalization

Collective action and the evolution of social norm internalization

Individualism–collectivism, governance and economic development

Methodological Issues in Studying Cultural Dimensions with Special Reference to Educational Context

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About