Cumulative Legitimation, Prudential Restraint, and the Maintenance of International Order: A Re-examination of the UN Charter System1

Abstract

Much of the existing literature has accorded the Security Council with collective authority to confer legitimacy on actions involving the use of armed force. However, because of the veto, scholars have been able to point to relatively few instances in which the Charter has functioned thusly to legitimate or to restrain the actions of powerful states. This article provides an alternative conceptualization, treating the Charter as the basis of a broader system of international order in which legitimacy is conferred cumulatively, by both states within the Security Council and those outside of it, based on the extent of actions’ congruence with Charter rules that serve states’ shared interests. States’ expressions of acceptance confer legitimacy, while their expressions (and acts) of resistance withhold legitimacy, evoking prudential restraint from major powers attempting to signal their continuing commitment to the existing, postwar international order. The article applies this conceptualization to a case study of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

The Legitimacy of the UN Security Council: Evidence from Recent General Assembly Debates

“…They argue that legitimation is an “activity which can be observed[;] it is something that people do, just as they challenge legitimation” (Barker :24). In international politics, legitimation may occur through public statements, diplomatic exchanges, or practical support (Westra :523); states may also apply strategies of delegitimation when they condemn a powerful state or revoke support from it in international institutions (Walt ). Some scholars focus on how subordinates legitimate power holders (Beetham :19).…”

“…Voeten (:543, 551) conceives of the Council as an “elite pact” that functions as a focal point for governments, helping them to “coordinate what limits to the exercise of power should be defended,” thus contributing to effectively enforcing constraints on the United States and, in doing so, playing a legitimizing role in global politics. Westra (:522) argues that great powers do not seek Security Council authorization as a means of collective legitimation but rather to persuade other states that their actions are in accordance with Charter rules intended to sustain the existing international order whose legitimacy is based on habit and rational calculation. What our analysis shows is that these studies paint too bleak a picture of the legitimacy of the Council.…”

The effect of expert recommendations on intergovernmental decision-making: North Korea, Iran, and non-proliferation sanctions in the Security Council

“…Indifferent members will also have an interest in following the recommendation because it helps coordinate diverging interests, and following a recommendation is easier to justify vis-à-vis regional groups or their allies than choosing a non-recommended solution. 36 Those who prefer to disregard the expert recommendation will struggle to avoid its implications and face the difficulty of identifying an equally well-accepted focal point. If opposing members could invoke a different, but similarly salient recommendation, the power of the expert recommendation as a focal point would diminish accordingly.…”

Legal asymmetries in asymmetric war

“…Fourth, states have a vested interest in maintaining the legitimacy of the system of international law, and thus may comply with the LOAC to signal their commitment to the broader international system of state-based order. 76 Fifth, state and non-state actors are pushed towards or away from compliance in war by their own strategic interests, as will be discussed in the following section. Compared with nonstate actors, then, democracies are pushed toward compliance by a range of 'broader enforcement mechanisms' such as international and domestic opinion, organisational culture, and their own increasing capabilities.…”