Curb EU enthusiasm: how politicisation shapes bureaucratic responsiveness

Yordanova, Nikoleta; Khokhlova, Aleksandra; Ershova, Anastasia; Schmidt, Fabian David; Glavaš, Goran

doi:10.1080/01402382.2024.2318998

Cited by 1 publication

(1 citation statement)

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“…These tertiary acts have tremendous consequences for the member states as they determine how the EU policies are implemented by national governments. Thus, they enable the Commission to alter the spirit of EU legislation without necessarily taking on board the preferences of all legislators, which the Commission has incentives to do (Ershova et al 2023;Williams and Bevan 2019;Yordanova et al 2024). Therefore, as in most political systems, delegation of powers to the EU executive is accompanied by control procedures that seek to keep it in check with the legislature's preferences.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Delegating legislative powers to the European Commission: the threat of non-compliance with tertiary legislation in the member states

Yordanova,

Zhelyazkova

2024

J. Pub. Pol.

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When does the delegation of legislative powers to the executive endanger policy compliance? The European Union (EU) Lisbon Treaty introduced quasi-legislative tertiary legislation – delegated acts – which empowers the European Commission to amend secondary legislation. Formally, member states control delegated acts only ex post via a veto power in the Council, while they have both ex ante amendment powers and ex post veto over the alternative Commission legislation: implementing acts. However, as member states determine the choice of legislative instrument, we argue that they would consent to the Commission adopting delegated acts only on non-controversial issues. Such selection should result in their lower compliance with implementing than with delegated acts. Our analyses of member states’ transposition delays and infringement cases related to EU tertiary directives support this argument. The results suggest that the delegation of legislative powers to the executive does not increase non-compliance when the legislators have the means to moderate it ex ante.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%