Curbing protest through elite co-optation? Regional protest mobilization by the Russian systemic opposition during the ‘for fair elections’ protests 2011–2012

Abstract

How does co-optation of oppositional party elites influence their protest behavior in times of cross-societal protest mobilization? Rational-Choice theories of authoritarian stability postulate that opposition elites receive material incentives in parliaments that motivate them to demobilize their radical supporters, which leads to increased regime stability. Based on a novel dataset, this article examines the protest behavior of the Russian parliamentary opposition parties (the CPRF, the LDPR and JR) and their activists during the protest wave of 2011/12 as a function of each party's co-optation in the regional parliaments. Co-optation is measured by the number of leadership posts that a party holds in the regional legislature. Protest mobilization is captured by (1) the number of protest events organized by each party and (2) the aggregate number of party activists present at protest events per region. The results show clear differences between the parties: Whereas the protest behavior of the communist CPRF is not influenced by regional elite co-optation, the analysis shows negative correlations for the LDPR and JR. The results suggest that co-optation may indeed be effective in reducing protest in contentious times-but that its effect varies for different actors.

Social Policy on Social Media: How Opposition Actors Used Twitter and VKontakte to Oppose the Russian Pension Reform

“…Zyuganov's statements are a carefully phrased walk on a tightrope, but the same cannot be said about the party as a whole. Instead, its online communications seem to reflect the relatively high independence of regional and local party branches, which is in line with earlier findings on the party's regional protest behavior (Dollbaum 2017).…”

“…Third, the study provides fruitful insights into the KPRF's behavior. In particular, the breadth of views and interpretations that make their way into the party's online communication bolsters previous findings on the considerable autonomy of local party branches and activist groups (Dollbaum 2017;Hutcheson 2005). At the same time, the apparent lack of cohesion in framing and strategic use of social media make the KPRF appear to be punching below its weight.…”

“…In accordance with the functionalist arguments on the tempering of opposition through including them in parliaments (Williamson and Magaloni 2020), Reuter and Robertson (2015) have found that the KPRF is susceptible to cooptation incentives, reducing its protest activities in regions where its elites control lucrative parliamentary posts. However, in contrast to the other two parliamentary opposition parties (the nationalist LDPR and the center-left Just Russia), this cooptation incentive appeared not to have affected the KPRF during the largest post-Soviet protest wave in 2011-2012 (Dollbaum 2017), suggesting that the party's public activity is a permanent balance between voice and loyalty. As an in-system party in an essentially uncompetitive authoritarian regime, it participates at the mercy of the authorities and thus needs to avoid provoking its marginalization and exclusion by attacking the authoritarian hierarchy (think: the ultimate public authority of the president).…”

Elite Coalitions and Power Balance across African Regimes: Introducing the African Cabinet and Political Elite Data Project (ACPED)

“…Another literature argues that African regimes are broad-based coalitions that co-opt potential ethnic and political rivals through the allocation of government posts and access to state resources (Dollbaum, 2017;Lindemann, 2011b;Van de Walle, 2007). The 'big tent' model is a political safety net with substantial benefits to anchor elites to the regimes as resources, rents, and power entices and retains clients (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007;Lindberg & Morrison, 2008;Van de Walle, 2003).…”

Career Trajectories of Regional Officials: Russia and China Before and After 2012

“…Evidently Xi Jinping needed to consolidate his support within the party before the congress could be convened (Dotson 2012). In Russia, unexpectedly large-scale public protests over election falsification in the 2011-2012 election cycle revealed widespread discontent in many major cities (Reuter and Szakonyi 2013;Dollbaum 2017). In 2013-14, the Ukrainian crisis, followed by the annexation of Crimea, was used by Putin to mobilize patriotic sentiment as a means of raising popular support for the regime.…”