Current Injection Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange

Chen, Hsien-Pu; Mohammad, Muneer; Kish, László B.

doi:10.1515/mms-2016-0025

Cited by 24 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…ii) Active attacks, where Eve either modifies the information channel or she injects an extra current into that. Current injection attack [30,49] and the man-in-the-attack [50] are the explored examples [2006]. Due to the current and voltage comparison [50] feature and its more advanced cable-modeling version [49], active attacks are, so far, the least efficient attacks against the KLJN scheme.…”

Section: On Former Attacks Against the Kljn Secure Key Distributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Static-loop-current Attack Against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) Secure Key Exchange System

Melhem

Kish

2019

Applied Sciences

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A new attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) key distribution system is explored. The attack is based on utilizing a parasitic dc-voltage-source in the loop.Relevant situations often exist in the low-frequency limit in practical systems, especially when the communication is over a distance, due to a ground loop and/or electromagnetic interference (EMI).Surprisingly, the usual current/voltage comparison based defense method that exposes active attacks or parasitic features (such as wire resistance allowing information leak) does not function here. The attack is successfully demonstrated. Proposed defense methods against it are shown.

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Section: On Former Attacks Against the Kljn Secure Key Distributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Static-loop-current Attack Against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) Secure Key Exchange System

Melhem

Kish

2019

Applied Sciences

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“…Several active attacks have been proposed against the KLJN system [5,11,12], but the defense method mentioned above is able to protect the system and maintain its unconditional security under general conditions [12]. Specifically, the KLJN system has been proposed to deliver unconditional security for hardware in computers, games and instruments [13] and to be used as a PUF device [2].…”

Section: The Kljn Key Exchange Schemementioning

confidence: 99%

Unconditionally Secure Credit/Debit Card Chip Scheme and Physical Unclonable Function

et al. 2017

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Abstract. The statistical-physics-based Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) key exchange offers a new and simple unclonable system for credit/debit card chip authentication and payment. The key exchange, the authentication and the communication are unconditionally secure so that neither mathematics-nor statistics-based attacks are able to crack the scheme. The ohmic connection and the short wiring lengths between the chips in the card and the terminal constitute an ideal setting for the KLJN protocol, and even its simplest versions offer unprecedented security and privacy for credit/debit card chips and applications of physical unclonable functions.

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“…Inspired by these results, Kish and Granqvist proposed a Random-Resistor-Random-Temperature (RRRT-) KLJN scheme that uses random resistances and random temperatures from a continuum interval [21]. Nonetheless, as in any physical scheme of key exchange, various types of attacks against the KLJN system have been (and continue to be) implemented [22][23][24][25][26][27][28]. Fortunately, so far, for each one of those speci¯c attacks, there is a defense mechanism that has been proven to be e®ective [8][9][10][29][30][31][32][33][34] In the KLJN secure key exchanger, the key bits are generated based on measurements of the mean-square value of the noise (voltage and/or current) of the channel between the two communicating parties.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimization-Based Strategies for the Error Removal Method in the Ideal, Symmetric KLJN Secure Key Exchanger

Collado

Sáez

2019

Fluct. Noise Lett.

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The Kirchhoff’s-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key exchanger is a simple, low-cost scheme that provides symmetric encryption with unconditional security in electronic communication. The key bits are generated based on measurements of the mean-square value of the noise voltage and/or current of the channel between the two communicating parties. In this work, a combined current–voltage measurement mode scenario and an error removal method for the ideal, symmetric KLJN secure key exchanger that uses an identical pair of resistors at both ends of the communication line were considered, which improves the fidelity and reduces the bit error probability compared to the schemes when either voltage or current measurement are being used. It has been shown in previous works that the error probability of the original, symmetric KLJN secure key exchanger decays exponentially with parameters such as the time window for performing the key exchange and other relevant criteria used in the interpretation of the key bits. The objective of this work is to develop optimization strategies for the ideal, symmetric KLJN secure key exchanger in order to obtain optimal values of these parameters while ensuring that errors are kept within acceptable values. For those strategies, closed-form solutions to the optimal values were derived by solving the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions. Numerical results show that the proposed optimization techniques not only ensure that the bit probability error remains within the desired limit, but also provide more flexibility to define the thresholds values, reduce the bit exchange period needed to guarantee an acceptable bit error probability, weaken Eve’s statistics, and improve the system resource managing.

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Current Injection Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Exchange

Cited by 24 publications

References 45 publications

A Static-loop-current Attack Against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) Secure Key Exchange System

A Static-loop-current Attack Against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) Secure Key Exchange System

Unconditionally Secure Credit/Debit Card Chip Scheme and Physical Unclonable Function

Optimization-Based Strategies for the Error Removal Method in the Ideal, Symmetric KLJN Secure Key Exchanger

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