Cyber Deterrence: The Past, Present, and Future

Abstract

The question on whether and how deterring an adversary in or through cyberspace is feasible has provoked the minds of scholars and practitioners for decades. Today, cyber deterrence remains a quintessential anchoring concept for the political debates on cyber policy. However, does the concept of deterrence in cyberspace have a future when for almost three decades little to no seemingly feasible practical solutions nor an academic consensus have emerged? The purpose of this chapter is to situate the current debate on cyber deterrence within the historical evolution of deterrence thinking in cyberspace, clarify the existing conceptualizations, and comprehensively discuss whether the concept of cyber deterrence has an analytical future. We argue that the future deterrence debate can move into four directions: increased incorporation of cyber deterrence as an element within the broader international security and contest in a multi-domain world. A deeper focus on the technical aspects of the cyber domain to achieve deterrence effects on the operational and tactical level. A closer analysis of compellence, as the alternative form of coercion. And an exploration of new strategic concepts that seeks to contain and blunt adversarial aggression in cyberspace that stands apart from traditional deterrence thinking.

Options for Signalling Cyber Deterrence Using Cyber Capabilities

“…For the challenges presented, the academic discussion on cyber deterrence still debates different implementation options (Soesanto & Smeets, 2021). Cyber persistence theory offers a novel solution to protecting a state's sovereignty in cyberspace by continuously seeking initiatives to create and maintain favourable conditions of security in cyberspace.…”

“…Third, it may mean using the state's cyber capabilities as a deterrent against a cyberattack. (Soesanto & Smeets, 2021) This paper investigates the third option from the perspective of deterrence signalling.…”

2019–2023 in Review: Projecting DDoS Threats With ARIMA and ETS Forecasting Techniques

“…Further testing of the correlation between DDoS attacks and geopolitical tensions through the lens of Realist Theory would involve examining whether these attacks align with the national interests or strategic objectives of the states involved -this aspect would be great area for future collaboration with political scientists. 2) Cyber Deterrence Theory: Building on the principles of traditional deterrence theory [53], [54], Cyber Deterrence Theory explores how the threat of retaliation or punitive action can be used to prevent adversaries from launching cyberattacks [55], [56], [57], [58]. Reflecting through the lens of this framework, there are indicators in the sample size of major incidents that we ex-amined, that suggest that major DDoS attacks against a nation's critical infrastructure for example can be seen as acts that test the resilience and response capabilities of the target state.…”

Conclusion

“…Over the years there has been considerable work invested at the science-policy interface in adapting deterrence to the ambiguous context of cyberspace. The scope of the practical applicability of the tenets of deterrence to cyberspace is considerably more limited than in more traditional conventional and nuclear deterrence settings (Soesanto and Smeets 2020). At the same time, deterrence attempts in cybersecurity and cyber defense span a wide spectrum of threats, including cybercrime, cyber espionage, and operational cyberattack.…”