Cyber-power system security in a smart grid environment

Ştefanov, Alexandru; Liu, Chen‐Ching

doi:10.1109/isgt.2012.6175560

Cited by 35 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Cyberbased contingency analysis is a fundamentally new way to assess the system stability by considering all plausible attack vectors. These attack vectors can be any combination of these: (i) distributed denial of service (DDoS) [63]- [65], (ii) alter and hide (AaH) [66], (iii) data integrity [63], [67]- [71], (iv) load altering [72], [73], or/and (v) disruptive switching [64].…”

Section: ) Cyber-related Contingenciesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impact Assessment of Hypothesized Cyberattacks on Interconnected Bulk Power Systems

Ten

Yamashita

Yang

et al. 2018

IEEE Trans. Smart Grid

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The first-ever Ukraine cyberattack on power grid has proven its devastation by hacking into their critical cyber assets. With administrative privileges accessing substation networks/local control centers, one intelligent way of coordinated cyberattacks is to execute a series of disruptive switching executions on multiple substations using compromised supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. These actions can cause significant impacts to an interconnected power grid. Unlike the previous power blackouts, such high-impact initiating events can aggravate operating conditions, initiating instability that may lead to system-wide cascading failure. A systemic evaluation of "nightmare" scenarios is highly desirable for asset owners to manage and prioritize the maintenance and investment in protecting their cyberinfrastructure. This survey paper is a conceptual expansion of real-time monitoring, anomaly detection, impact analyses, and mitigation (RAIM) framework that emphasizes on the resulting impacts, both on steady-state and dynamic aspects of power system stability. Hypothetically, we associate the combinatorial analyses of steady state on substations/components outages and dynamics of the sequential switching orders as part of the permutation. The expanded framework includes (1) critical/noncritical combination verification, (2) cascade confirmation, and (3) combination re-evaluation. This paper ends with a discussion of the open issues for metrics and future design pertaining the impact quantification of cyber-related contingencies.

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Section: ) Cyber-related Contingenciesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impact Assessment of Hypothesized Cyberattacks on Interconnected Bulk Power Systems

Ten

Yamashita

Yang

et al. 2018

IEEE Trans. Smart Grid

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“…Some protocols on this layer are Ethernet, Frame relay, and Asynchronous Transfer Mode. Among them, Ethernet is found to be used predominantly by all DER communications at this layer [66][67][68]. Hence, the other protocols on this layer will be considered beyond the scope of this paper.…”

Section: Data Link (Layer 2)mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Survey of Protocol-Level Challenges and Solutions for Distributed Energy Resource Cyber-Physical Security

et al. 2018

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The increasing proliferation of distributed energy resources (DERs) on the smart grid has made distributed solar and wind two key contributors to the expanding attack surface of the network; however, there is a lack of proper understanding and enforcement of DER communications security requirements. With vendors employing proprietary methods to mitigate hosts of attacks, the literature currently lacks a clear organization of the protocol-level vulnerabilities, attacks, and solutions mapped to each layer of the logical model such as the OSI stack. To bridge this gap and pave the way for future research by the authors in determining key DER security requirements, this paper conducts a comprehensive review of the key vulnerabilities, attacks, and potential solutions for solar and wind DERs at the protocol level. In doing so, this paper serves as a starting point for utilities, vendors, aggregators, and other industry stakeholders to develop a clear understanding of the DER security challenges and solutions, which are key precursors to comprehending security requirements.

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“…We can visualize the modernized grid as having two separate layers which will make up a complex cyberphysical system. This manner of description combines the current power grid which is composed of generation, transmission, and distribution [3], and a cybercommunication layer for each of the power grid's domains which will then be connected and integrated with measures for useful interoperability. Each of these domains must have physical and cyber interfaces to allow for proper communication between devices connected to the grid which depend on mass aggregation of customer and equipment operational data.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recent work in this area includes [3], which utilized a custom cyber-security testbed architecture in order to detail attack and mitigation scenarios within that simulated microgrid environment. These scenarios utilize common hacking tools to exploit vulnerabilities while mitigation is attributed to anomaly-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and firewalls.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Smart Grid Attacks and Countermeasures

McCary¹,

Xiao²

2015

EAI Endorsed Transactions on Industrial Networks and Intelligen

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The term "Smart Grid" has been coined and used for several years to describe the efforts of the current power grid modernization effort. This effort plans to introduce self-healing, energy efficiency, reliability, and security using two-way digital communications and control technology, along with a host of other valuable attributes. As a bi-product of this modernization and newly gained systems interoperability, new communications and management interfaces are produced in both the cyber realm and physical domains. The increase of the public physical presence and cyber footprint opens up avenues for compromise to hackers and individuals with malicious intent. This survey paper will categorize and summarize vulnerabilities in the framework of the current power grid and the software and hardware which is currently being used to upgrade the grid. The paper will also detail known countermeasures which can be used to mitigate or eliminate attacks which exploit such vulnerabilities.

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Cyber-power system security in a smart grid environment

Cited by 35 publications

References 3 publications

Impact Assessment of Hypothesized Cyberattacks on Interconnected Bulk Power Systems

Impact Assessment of Hypothesized Cyberattacks on Interconnected Bulk Power Systems

A Survey of Protocol-Level Challenges and Solutions for Distributed Energy Resource Cyber-Physical Security

Smart Grid Attacks and Countermeasures

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