DOI: 10.31274/etd-180810-3993
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Cyber risk modeling and attack-resilient control for power grid

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Cited by 5 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…A variety of hypothesized attack schemes targeting the generation, transmission, distribution, customer, and electricity markets domain exists and are investigated. Examples are: denial of service (DoS) attacks that flood and congest the network with maliciously generated traffic [7], data integrity (DI) attacks that manipulate control or measurement signals [8], and switching attacks where assets such as power lines, loads or DERs are switched on and off to cause instabilities and/or outages in the power system [9]. For a thorough analysis of their impact in the power system domain, the dynamics of power system assets, control and protection circuits need to be considered [10].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A variety of hypothesized attack schemes targeting the generation, transmission, distribution, customer, and electricity markets domain exists and are investigated. Examples are: denial of service (DoS) attacks that flood and congest the network with maliciously generated traffic [7], data integrity (DI) attacks that manipulate control or measurement signals [8], and switching attacks where assets such as power lines, loads or DERs are switched on and off to cause instabilities and/or outages in the power system [9]. For a thorough analysis of their impact in the power system domain, the dynamics of power system assets, control and protection circuits need to be considered [10].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As the shift to sustainable energy sources is on the rise, the reliability of stable power delivery becomes more fragile [8]. The need for superior control methods in order to counter the effects of interdependence between the physical and cyber networks [32], the impact of any attack can be astronomical. The December 2015 attack on the Ukrainian power grid which affected thousands is one of the most sophisticated attack on the power grid [34].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is further undermined by the retention of legacy equipment in order to optimize costs and complexity faced during the transformation. With increasing interdependence between the physical and cyber networks [32], the impact of any attack can be astronomical. The December 2015 attack on the Ukrainian power grid which affected thousands is one of the most sophisticated attack on the power grid [34].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%