Dangerous liaisons

Abstract

This article applies recent advances in network analysis to highlight a central tension faced by policymakersbalancing the benefits of engaging with the international system and the associated domestic policy costs. International trade rewards certain domestic practices, such as respect for human rights. Enforcing such practices, however, is politically costly and sometimes prohibitive to state leaders who rely on political repression to stay in power. In such cases, domestic elites often resort to an alternative strategy of securing the benefits of international tradesetting up indirect trade channels through intermediary states. These competing incentives are modeled within a single framework using a formal network game in which states form trade-links (direct or indirect) with other states, while simultaneously choosing their optimal level of domestic human rights protections. The model suggests that there may be an inverse relationship between a state's embeddedness within a network of indirect trade and respect for human rights: indirect trade channels serve as loopholes that allow domestically troubled states to enjoy the benefits of trade without pressure for domestic improvement. The predictions are supported by the results of the empirical analyses of the international trade and repression data (1987)(1988)(1989)(1990)(1991)(1992)(1993)(1994)(1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000), conducted using a coevolutionary actor-oriented longitudinal-network model -a statistical estimator that closely mimics the theoretical model.

What drives the adoption of climate change mitigation policy? A dynamic network approach to policy diffusion

“…Consequently, scholars across different policy areas have been assimilating a more refined analytical approach to understand these interdependencies, where the behavior of one actor can be dependent on the actions of other actors (Dorussen, Ward 2010). For examples in different policy domains using network analysis to explain policy diffusion, see Chyzh (2016), who studied human rights diffusion via trade networks; Haim (2016), who investigated how a network of international political alliances influence trade flows; and Mohrenberg (2017), who studied the diffusion of foreign trade policies through bilateral trade flows. Our article contributes to and builds on this literature using network analysis to explain policy diffusion in the context of climate policy on the country level.…”

Interstate Resource Conflicts: A Network-Centric Resource Access Security Perspective

“…Hafner-Burton & Montgomery (2006) establish that many states with the same degree in IGO networks in fact increase the likelihood of conflict, and Maoz et al (2007) show a similar effect when imbalances of positive and negative ties (‘the friend [enemy] of my friend is my friend [enemy]’) occur. Regarding trade, Haim (2016) demonstrates that the effect of alliance networks on bilateral trade is much larger than that of dyadic alliances, and Chyzh (2016) suggests that indirect trade channels enable states to participate in trade without the need to adhere to human rights. As Gartzke and Westerwinter (2016) suggest for economic relationships and Dorussen, Gartzke, and Westerwinter (2016a) in general, extradyadic ties are very relevant in determining and understanding factors driving conflict.…”

The coevolution of trade agreements and investment treaties: Some evidence from network analysis

“…Several studies employ social network analysis to discuss the network evolution of trade agreements (flows) and BITs (Askari et al, 2018;Chyzh, 2016;Kim & Shin, 2002;Lovrić et al, 2018;Mahutga, 2006;Rossem, 1996;Saban et al, 2010;Zhou et al, 2016). Among them, recent works applied the SAOM to evaluate the dynamic patterns of the formation of international agreements.…”