Over its brief history, the discipline of psychology has seen its fair share of crises (Farr, 1991). In the grand scheme of academic scholarship, it has sandwiched itself between the natural and the social sciences. This positioning, in itself, has fuelled fierce as well as productive debates concerning the discipline's scope, its phenomenology, epistemology, and methodology (see Toomela & Valsiner, 2010). The latest crisis to afflict the discipline is the infamous 'replication crisis', precipitated by the Reproducibility Project which claimed that it was only able to find evidence for successful replication of published psychological findings in 47% of cases (i.e. less than chance, or 50%). No doubt, many expected a higher replication rate, betraying a long held but little researched assumption concerning the immutability of psychological phenomena. To put it simply, many expect psychological findings to replicate invariably across diverse sociocultural contexts in the same way that, for instance, medical diagnoses do (see Sammut, Foster, Salvatore, & Andrisano-Ruggieri, 2016). If one is diagnosed with diabetes in the US, one does not expect different insulin uptake upon migration to China. Similar expectations are levelled at psychology, based chiefly upon the discipline's claims to knowledge concerning psychopathology and personality. Like medical research, psychological scholarship here serves to typify and characterize individuals in ways that facilitate treatment of psychological symptoms, conditions, or disorders. Unlike medical research, however, psychological functioning seems to be amenable to, if not contingent upon, sociocultural influences. For instance, we are not entirely sure whether the human personality is primarily composed of the Big Five trait constellation