Das Ende der Dieselsubvention: Verteilungseffekte einer CO2-basierten Energiesteuerreform

Abstract

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Distributional effects of carbon pricing by transport fuel taxation

“…We expect the joint effect of these tax changes to be clearly progressive. Also, the results of our preceding analysis strongly point into this direction (Jacobs and Quack, 2018). These considerations yield:…”

“…(2016) simulate a fuel tax of 0.703 euro/l, which implies a much stronger increase for diesel than for petrol, and find a slightly regressive joint effect. Jacobs and Quack (2018) find a progressive effect for a revenue-neutral introduction of a fuel tax based on CO 2 emissions, which leads to an increase of the fuel tax on diesel by 0.19 euro/l and a decrease of the fuel tax on petrol by 0.12 euro/l.…”

“…Bork (2000), Grub (2000) and Bach et al (2002) use data that dates back to 1993. The database utilised by Jacobs and Quack (2018) is rather small and does not adequately reflect the German population. Only the studies of Bach et al (2018) and adequately account for the income heterogeneity of households owning diesel and petrol cars.…”

“…Except from the work of Eisenmann et al (2020) 8 , none of the reported German studies appropriately considers the extensive structural developments of the German car fleet in terms of diesel use, which is of utter importance: On the one hand, the fuel tax per litre of petrol is around 39% higher than of diesel. On the other hand, the average annual mileage for both petrol and diesel rises significantly with income, but much faster for diesel than for petrol (Jacobs and Quack, 2018). Overall, diesel accounts for around 45% of the annual mileage of private households (Federal Statistical Office, 2020).…”

“…This increase is much stronger for diesel than for petrol. Car-ownership rises with household income (Nobis and Kuhnimhof, 2018) and fuel efficiency is comparatively unaffected by income (Jacobs and Quack, 2018). With rising income, households therefore consume more petrol and diesel on average.…”