Das politische System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Rudzio, Wolfgang

doi:10.1007/978-3-322-85268-7

Cited by 21 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…The COVID‐19 pandemic did not impact the legal relationship between the federal government and the Länder insofar as the clear division of competencies for both healthcare and emergency management was maintained in line with the overall tradition of ‘executive federalism’. Executive federalism describes “a functional separation under which the federal government is assigned the bulk of legislative power while the states exercise most administrative powers” (Heidenheimer, 1966: 172 as cited in Rudzio, 2019: 307). In line with this separation of legal competencies, the Länder adopted their own lockdown and contact restrictions to implement the IfSG.…”

Section: Germanymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Decentralisation in Times of Crisis: Asset Or Liability? The Case of Germany and Italy During Covid‐19

Kuhn

Morlino

2021

Swiss Political Sci Review

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How did the legal and political‐administrative relationship between central and local governments of two decentralised states shape their response to COVID‐19? Literature and theories on decentralisation argue that federal and decentralised states are less able to respond to crises in a coordinated manner due to their perceived greater susceptibility to political conflict. Situated within this theoretical debate and based on the analysis of legal acts, political decisions, and relevant national news media articles between March and August 2020 in Germany and Italy, this research note shows that, counterintuitively, more decentralisation does not necessarily translate into more legal and political stress during pandemic management. In responding to the COVID‐19 pandemic, Germany, a highly decentralised state, experienced less legal and political tensions than the less decentralised Italy. The key to understanding this variation lies in different institutional arrangements, complemented by the specific political cultures of both states.

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Section: Germanymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although the agreements reached in these consultations are non‐binding, Bund and Länder usually abide by them. Therefore, even issues that fall under the exclusive competence of the Länder are marked by high levels of standardisation and harmonisation (Rudzio, 2019: 313f. ).…”

Section: Germanymentioning

confidence: 99%

Decentralisation in Times of Crisis: Asset Or Liability? The Case of Germany and Italy During Covid‐19

Kuhn

Morlino

2021

Swiss Political Sci Review

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“…The coordination sections identify controversial items, prepare the agenda for interministerial coordination meetings, and act as ‘honest brokers’ (interview 4) in conflicts. 70 to 90 per cent of all EU‐related dossiers are cleared this way before reaching the minister level (Rudzio, 2015). The Permanent Representation functions as a nodal point of formal coordination between Berlin‐based ministries and the Council in Brussels (Bulmer and Paterson, 2018, p. 92). Coordination involves all levels of the federal bureaucracy.…”

Section: Germany's Decentralized Eu Policy Coordination In Ordinary T...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Decentralized EU Policy Coordination in Crisis? The Case of Germany

Freudlsperger

Weinrich

2021

J of Common Market Studies

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Europeanization research found no general convergence towards centralized EU policy coordination, despite decentralized systems' comparatively slow and ineffective position-taking. Does this finding hold against the threat, urgency, and uncertainty exerted by recent years' polycrisis? We posit that decentralized systems indeed persist, albeit in a three-step reactive sequence in which situational centralization during crises dialectically reinforces decentralization in the long run. First, the prime minister's office harnesses a crisis to acquire hierarchical control of position-taking. Second, to exploit the deep expertise of the bureaucracy and maximize its bargaining power on the EU-level, it co-opts a lead ministry. Third, due to the institutional underpinnings of the decentralized system, the lead ministry, rather than the prime minister's office, eventually retains the administrative capacities created in crisis. We illustrate this causal mechanism in a comparison of the German government's EU policy coordination during the Eurozone and Schengen crises.

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“…Government ministers may draft a bill but hand it to an MP in order to save time in the legislative process or to avoid being associated with it. Disguised government bills in Germany (Rudzio 2006: 225–230) and so‐called ‘handout bills’ in the United Kingdom are examples of this (Griffith & Ryle 1989: 310–314). Also, governing party bills may be sponsored by members of one governing party only, but have the backing (or not) of all government parties.…”

Section: Agenda‐setting In Parliamentary Democraciesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Legislative agenda‐setting in parliamentary democracies

Bräuninger¹,

Debus

2009

European J Political Res

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Various strands of literature in comparative politics regard governments as the only noteworthy initiators and mainsprings of legislative policy making in parliamentary democracies. Opposition activity in policy making is more often associated with the intention to prevent, rather than to shape, policy. Does this perception reflect real‐life politics? To answer this question, this article discusses different arguments that link institutional and policy‐related characteristics to the incentives and constraints of different government and parliamentary actors to initiate or co‐sponsor legislative bills. More specifically, it relates policy‐, office‐ and vote‐related incentives, as well as institutional and resource constraints of legislative actors, to the likelihood that these actors will take the lead in legislative agenda‐setting. These arguments are confronted with original data on the universe of all legislative bills in four parliamentary systems over one and a half decades. The article concludes that opposition and, in particular, bipartisan agenda‐setting is indeed rare. Yet, in contrast to widely held maxims, it is neither absent nor spurious, but related to the allocation of power and the intensity of ideological conflict both within and between the (coalition) government and parliament.

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Das politische System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland

Cited by 21 publications

References 0 publications

Decentralisation in Times of Crisis: Asset Or Liability? The Case of Germany and Italy During Covid‐19

Decentralisation in Times of Crisis: Asset Or Liability? The Case of Germany and Italy During Covid‐19

Decentralized EU Policy Coordination in Crisis? The Case of Germany

Legislative agenda‐setting in parliamentary democracies

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