Das Verhalten von Betriebsräten in der Kündigungssituation

Höland, Armin

doi:10.1007/978-3-663-01695-3_4

“…"Age" and "Tenure" refer to absolute values in years and "Job satisfaction" to an average value stemming from an interval ranging from zero to ten. 1985, 1989, 1993, 2001. Standard errors of the coefficients are robust to general second moment misspecification.…”

Section: Summary and Interpretative Conclusionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Trade union membership and dismissals

Goerke

¹

,

Pannenberg

²

2011

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This series presents research findings based either directly on data from the German SocioEconomic Panel Study (SOEP) or using SOEP data as part of an internationally comparable data set (e.g. CNEF, ECHP, LIS, LWS, CHER/PACO). SOEP is a truly multidisciplinary household panel study covering a wide range of social and behavioral sciences: economics, sociology, psychology, survey methodology, econometrics and applied statistics, educational science, political science, public health, behavioral genetics, demography, geography, and sport science. Terms of use: Documents inThe decision to publish a submission in SOEPpapers is made by a board of editors chosen by the DIW Berlin to represent the wide range of disciplines covered by SOEP. There is no external referee process and papers are either accepted or rejected without revision. Papers appear in this series as works in progress and may also appear elsewhere. They often represent preliminary studies and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be requested from the author directly. AbstractIn Germany, there is no trade union membership wage premium, while the membership fee amounts to 1% of the gross wage. Therefore, prima facie, there are strong incentives to freeride on the benefits of trade unionism. We establish empirical evidence for a private gain from trade union membership which has hitherto not been documented: in West Germany, union members are less likely to lose their jobs than non-members. In particular, using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel we can show that roughly 50% of the observed raw differential in individual dismissal rates can be explained by the estimated average partial effect of union membership.JEL Classification: C 23, H 41, J 51, J 63

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“…Kraft 1986) or they did not use state-of-the-art econometrics to isolate the genuine impact of plant-level representation (cf. Falke et al 1981;Holand 1983Holand , 1985 on dismissals.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutional Frameworks and Labor Market Performance

Buttler¹,

Franz²,

Schettkat³

et al. 2005

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The labor markets in the United States and in Germany could hardly be more different. The USA, with its tremendous job growth, is often held up as the prime example of the jobcreating power of unfettered markets, while Germany is seen as the textbook case of an overregulated European labor market stifling employment growth. For many policy advisers the lessons are clear: if Europeans want to emulate the success of the Americans, they must deregulate their economies. On the other hand, economists in the USA, impressed with Germany's income growth and social stability, have shown increasing interest in the role that nonmarket institutions play in the German context.Institutional Frameworks and Labor Market Performance provides an in-depth analysis of the functioning of various labor market institutions in both the USA and Germany. In close studies of the regulatoty differences between the two countries, the authors examine the impact of those institutions on economic performance. On the basis of their findings they argue that the choice is not one between regulation and deregulation, but rather between different forms and degrees of regulation. FIGURES 13.3 Ratio of Overall Hires, Intraemployment Hires, and Hires from Nonemployment for Germany (1970-1991) 13.4 The U.S. and German Beveridge Curves 13.5 Change-duration Curves for Unemployment and Vacancies in

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“… However, the evidence that works councils actually reduce dismissals is limited. Höland (, pp. 97 ff) found that councils did not object to dismissals in 70 to 80 percent of all cases in the 1980s.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Sickness Absence and Works Councils: Evidence from German Individual and Linked Employer–Employee Data

Arnold

¹

,

Brändle

²

,

Goerke

³

2018

Industrial Relations

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Using both household and linked employer-employee data for Germany, we assess the effects of non-union representation in the form of works councils on (1) individual sickness absence rates and (2) a subjective measure of personnel problems due to sickness absence as perceived by a firm's management. We find that the existence of a works council is positively correlated with the incidence and the annual duration of absence. We observe a more pronounced correlation in western Germany which can also be interpreted causally. Further, personnel problems due to absence are more likely to occur in plants with a works council. Terms of use: Documents inJEL Classification: J53, I18, M54

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Das Verhalten von Betriebsräten in der Kündigungssituation

Cited by 6 publications

References 2 publications

Trade union membership and dismissals

Trade union membership and dismissals

Institutional Frameworks and Labor Market Performance

Sickness Absence and Works Councils: Evidence from German Individual and Linked Employer–Employee Data

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