Data integrity attacks against the distributed real-time pricing in the smart grid

Yang, Xinyu; Zhang, Xialei; Lin, Jie; Yu, Wei; Fu, Xinwen; Zhao, Wei

doi:10.1109/pccc.2016.7820657

Cited by 13 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Mo et al [34] established a science of cyber-physical system security by integrating system theory and cyber security. Particularly, there have been a number of research efforts devoted to data integrity attacks against key functional modules in the energy-based cyber-physical systems, as well as defense thereof [7,14,15,32,35,36]. For example, Yang et al [13] developed an optimal attack strategy against the state estimation process that enables a minimum set of compromised sensors to launch a successful attack.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As a typical smart-world system, the smart cities that integrate energy, transportation and other smart-world components, potential adversaries may launch malicious attacks via controlling smart meter and sensor devices, and may manipulate critical information, including energy consumption/supply, the state of power transmission and distribution links, electricity prices, transportation routes, and so on [3,12,13,14,15,16]. As smart meters in the power grid subsystem, which is an essential component in the smart cities, are often deployed in the open environment, the power grid may suffer greater risks than the traditional power grid.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As smart meters in the power grid subsystem, which is an essential component in the smart cities, are often deployed in the open environment, the power grid may suffer greater risks than the traditional power grid. Unlike the cyber-attacks on communication networks alone, the potential attacks in the power grid can lead to serious economic and physical damages [7,13,14,15,17]. …”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There have been a number of research efforts devoted to studying the impacts of cyber-attacks in smart-world systems [4,5,6,7,11,12,13,14,15,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25]. Nonetheless, most of the existing efforts focus on strategies of attack or defense in a singular or specifically unique security issue, often in which only one adversary launches an attack at a time.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Towards an Iterated Game Model with Multiple Adversaries in Smart-World Systems

Yang

et al. 2018

Sensors

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Diverse and varied cyber-attacks challenge the operation of the smart-world system that is supported by Internet-of-Things (IoT) (smart cities, smart grid, smart transportation, etc.) and must be carefully and thoughtfully addressed before widespread adoption of the smart-world system can be fully realized. Although a number of research efforts have been devoted to defending against these threats, a majority of existing schemes focus on the development of a specific defensive strategy to deal with specific, often singular threats. In this paper, we address the issue of coalitional attacks, which can be launched by multiple adversaries cooperatively against the smart-world system such as smart cities. Particularly, we propose a game-theory based model to capture the interaction among multiple adversaries, and quantify the capacity of the defender based on the extended Iterated Public Goods Game (IPGG) model. In the formalized game model, in each round of the attack, a participant can either cooperate by participating in the coalitional attack, or defect by standing aside. In our work, we consider the generic defensive strategy that has a probability to detect the coalitional attack. When the coalitional attack is detected, all participating adversaries are penalized. The expected payoff of each participant is derived through the equalizer strategy that provides participants with competitive benefits. The multiple adversaries with the collusive strategy are also considered. Via a combination of theoretical analysis and experimentation, our results show that no matter which strategies the adversaries choose (random strategy, win-stay-lose-shift strategy, or even the adaptive equalizer strategy), our formalized game model is capable of enabling the defender to greatly reduce the maximum value of the expected average payoff to the adversaries via provisioning sufficient defensive resources, which is reflected by setting a proper penalty factor against the adversaries. In addition, we extend our game model and analyze the extortion strategy, which can enable one participant to obtain more payoff by extorting his/her opponents. The evaluation results show that the defender can combat this strategy by encouraging competition among the adversaries, and significantly suppress the total payoff of the adversaries via setting the proper penalty factor.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Towards an Iterated Game Model with Multiple Adversaries in Smart-World Systems

Yang

et al. 2018

Sensors

Self Cite

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“…ere are less power outages, lower transmission losses, fewer undetected faults, and decreased green house gas emissions. It also allows for distributing power sources, easier integration of renewable energy sources, and more customer choices and can even increase the capacity of the existing electric power networks [5,6]. A customer who has installed solar panels could at times produce more power than they need.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Application of Spritz Encryption in Smart Meters to Protect Consumer Data

Kiarie

Langat

Muriithi

2019

Journal of Computer Networks and Communications

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The ongoing upgrade of the electrical power system into a more powerful system known as Smart Grid has both benefits and costs. Smart Grid relies on advanced communication and hence offers better services through improved monitoring, planning, and control. However, enhanced communications make Smart Grid more susceptible to privacy leaks and cyber attacks. Small meters collect detailed consumer data, such as power consumption, which can then become a major source of privacy leakage. Encryption can help protect consumer data, but great care is needed. The popular RC4 (Rivest Cipher 4) encryption has been implemented in the widely deployed smart meter standard—Open Smart Grid Protocol (OSGP)—but has been shown to have major weaknesses. This paper proposes the use of Spritz encryption. Spritz is an RC4-like algorithm designed to repair weak design decisions in RC4 to improve security. A test on performing one encryption took only 0.85 milliseconds, showing that it is fast enough not to affect the operations of a smart meter. Its ability to withstand brute force attacks on small keys is also significantly greater than RC4’s ability.

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Cyber-Security of Protection System in Power Grids—Part 1: Vulnerabilities and Counter-Measures

Ameli

Ghafouri

et al. 2023

Power Systems

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Data integrity attacks against the distributed real-time pricing in the smart grid

Cited by 13 publications

References 24 publications

Towards an Iterated Game Model with Multiple Adversaries in Smart-World Systems

Towards an Iterated Game Model with Multiple Adversaries in Smart-World Systems

Application of Spritz Encryption in Smart Meters to Protect Consumer Data

Cyber-Security of Protection System in Power Grids—Part 1: Vulnerabilities and Counter-Measures

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