David, Goliath, and reverend Bayes: Prior beliefs about defendants' status in personal injury cases

Abstract

Two experiments were performed to ascertain the effect of the extra-legal factor of defendants' status on subjects'judgements in a simulated jury task. In support of the 'deep-pocket' hypothesis, high-status defendants were perceived as less sympathetic and were more likely to lose their case, even though the factual evidence was identical, than low-status defendants. There was a spillover effect, such that plaintiffs (Davids) suing high-status defendants (Goliaths) were themselves viewed as more sympathetic. The effect of defendants' status was mediated by the sentiments that it aroused toward both litigants; it was negligible with sympathy partialled out. Contrary to the deep-pocket hypothesis, high-status defendants did not have to pay more for the same injury; subjects are able to ignore status in awarding compensation when compensatory and punitive damages are clearly separated. In treating defendants differently depending on their status, subjects relied on relevant prior beliefs about the relationship of defendants' status to wealth, propensity to cause harm, and standards of accountability. The results are discussed in terms of the sometimes conflicting norms between an optimal decision-making model like Bayes' Theorem and legal guidelines for judgements of liability and compensation.Research on the variables that influence jurors' reasoning has its origin in cognitive and social psychological research on the ways in which social or situational factors might influence people's decisions (see, generally, Hans and Vidmar, 1986;Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington, 1983;Kagehiro and Laufer, 1992;Kerr and Bray, 1982;Konecni and Ebbesen, 1982).' From an information-processing approach, trials are situations that contain a dizzying array of stimuli, in the form of numerous participants and the information they provide. This informational component is The research reported here was supported by NSF Grant SES-8809299.I am grateful for helpful suggestions from ' Most research on jurors has been conducted using 'mock' or potential jurors-who are often college undergraduates-performing simulated tasks, rather than real jurors. This technique attempts to uncover general processes, in a controlled environment, which can then be generalized to real-world jurors. However, it raises questions about the external validity of the research. Comparisons of mock jurors to real ones are few, and they offer conflicting results (MacCoun, 1989; for a fuller discussion than can be presented here of the methodological issues involved in simulation research, see Kerr, 1979, 1982;Weiten and Diamond, 1979). Some of the more pertinent questions raised by jury simulations are treated in the General Discussion.

The More You Ask For, the More You Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts

“…In this experiment subjects did not award punitive damages and therefore may have used compensatory damages to serve a punitive function. This finding is consistent with other research showing that .the effect of extra-legal factors on jurors' judgments is often mediated by how those factors influence jurors' feelings toward the litigants (e.g., Bornstein, 1994;Kalven and Zeisel, 1966).…”

“…For example, the ad damnum should be irrelevant in determining liability, and the causal evidence should be irrelevant when determining compensation. Although in some cases jurors perceive extra-legal factors as relevant (e.g., Bornstein, 1994;Bornstein and Rajki, 1994), the fact that anchors did not affect ratings of the plaintiffs suffering or medical expenses suggests that our subjects did not view them as relevant. In any event, the influence of technically irrelevant anchors constitutes an extra-legal bias.…”

“…Plaintiffs requesting exorbitant amounts might be perceived as greedy and make an unfavorable impression, whde those who ask for unduly low amounts might arouse suspicion about their case's legitimacy. Such sentiments toward the litigants have been found to influence how jurors evaluate the evidence and reach verdicts in both actual (Kalven and Zeisel, 1966) and simulated trials (e.g., Bornstein, 1994). Thus, any effect of anchors on monetary awards could be offset by an effect on liability judgments.…”

Precious little guidance: Jury instruction on damage awards.

“…There were no differences in compensatory awards as a function of either of these manipulations, however. Bornstein (1994) also found that a large corporation was not made to pay more in compensation than a small, independently owned company.…”

The effects of sexual harassment severity and organizational policy and response on juror damage awards

“…If jurors believe that the defendant is wealthy, they are likely to render higher awards than if they believe the defendant is not wealthy (e.g., Bornstein, 1994;Robbennolt & Studebaker, 1999;c.f. Hans, 2000;MacCoun, 1996;Vidmar et al, 1994).…”