DC Pension Fund Best-practice Design and Governance

Clark, Gordon L.; Urwin, Roger

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1652680

Cited by 8 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 72 publications

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“…Second, should the choice of DC over DB remain irrevocable ? These questions are part of a larger agenda of research focused upon the design of DC plans in the context of the lessons learned from the behavioural revolution (Clark and Urwin, 2011).…”

Section: Synthesis Of Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pension plan participant choice: Evidence on defined benefit and defined contribution preferences

Gerrans

Clark

2013

Journal of Pension Economics and Finance

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We report analysis of voluntary switching from defined benefit (DB) to defined contribution (DC) plans in an environment best characterised as benign. Using a large Australian fund database we identify socio-demographic correlates and the macroeconomic circumstances associated with DB to DC switching. The age of participants is an important correlate of switching behaviour, suggesting a degree of risk tolerance previously not recognised in the literature. It is also noted, however, that this type of switching behaviour may involve secondary behaviour such that uncertainties of DC investment performance are managed by reference to an asset allocation formula that maps to the previous DB investment strategy.

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Section: Synthesis Of Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pension plan participant choice: Evidence on defined benefit and defined contribution preferences

Gerrans

Clark

2013

Journal of Pension Economics and Finance

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“…6. See Clark and Urwin (2011) and Clark and Urwin (2008). See also Ambachtsheer and McLaughlin (2015).…”

Section: International Normalisation Of Pension Fund Governancementioning

confidence: 99%

Occupational pension funds

Autenne

2017

European Journal of Social Security

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This article reviews the orientation of the European regulation on pension fund governance in the international context of the OECD’s recommendations. It outlines the features judged to be essential for a sound private pension scheme’s governance. It then describes the orientation of the European regulations in this area and sets out some criticisms. The focus is on private sector ‘defined-contribution’ occupational pension plans managed by a pension fund, in light of the shared perception that the ‘governance’ issue is particularly sensitive for these types of schemes.

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“…Most obviously, the lack of transparency as regards the underlying costs associated with competing investment options combined with difficulties in judging the relative and absolute performance of various investment options has meant that many participants have found it difficult to formulate and execute effective long‐term investment programmes (Choi et al ., 2002). At the same time, the cacophony of choice and the possibility that the available choice offered participants reflects the interests of plan sponsors and third‐party providers rather than participants adds a level of confusion and distrust to an already complex problem (Clark and Urwin, 2011). Furthermore, it is apparent that many participants are less than perfectly rational in the sense that their decision making is subject to recognised behavioural biases and anomalies including inertia, herding, framing, and risk aversion (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988).…”

Section: Workplace Retirement Savings Schemesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this paper, I explain the significance of public utilities arguing that they represent a remarkable re‐conceptualisation of pension solidarity from the workplace to some abstract notion of shared (financial) citizenship. This requires recounting the historical link between workplace pensions and corporatism, its decline, and the problematic nature of many countries' DC saving schemes which, intentionally or by effect, elide corporate responsibility (Clark and Urwin, 2011). Whereas the Australian system of mandatory contribution based upon member‐profit industry pension funds would seem to be an effective way of dealing with employer ambivalence, the federal government's introduction of a generic pension product represents a profound critique of the costs and consequences of the super industry.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

From Corporatism to Public Utilities: Workplace Pensions in the 21st Century

Clark¹

2011

Geographical Research

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For many Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development countries, workplace pensions have been an important mechanism for supplementing state‐sponsored social security. Notwithstanding significant differences between developed economies in the significance attached to workplace pensions, provision has been typically encouraged through preferential tax policies on benefits and compensation packages. If relevant for the baby‐boom generation, it is doubtful that these arrangements will be as important for future generations. As state‐sponsored social security has been discounted in terms of promised value and entitlement, traditional workplace pensions have been closing and replaced by retirement saving instruments that are neither as lucrative nor as dependable. Retrenchment in workplace pensions has prompted governments to consider and, in some cases, develop different types of retirement savings institutions. This paper charts the decline of traditional workplace pensions, the apparent inadequacy of alternatives such as money‐purchase (defined contribution) schemes, and the rise of what are referred to as ‘public utilities’: government sponsored savings institutions designed to compensate for the decline (in coverage and promised value) of workplace pensions albeit at a more modest level than that associated with traditional defined benefit schemes. Reference is made to the experience of the USA, the UK, and Australia with passing comments of related developments in Germany and continental Europe. It is argued that the rise of public utilities in this domain is indicative of the transformation of corporate capitalism over the past 25 years and the realisation that the costs of neoliberalism may be so significant that governments have to take responsibility, once again, for underwriting retirement welfare.

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DC Pension Fund Best-practice Design and Governance

Cited by 8 publications

References 72 publications

Pension plan participant choice: Evidence on defined benefit and defined contribution preferences

Pension plan participant choice: Evidence on defined benefit and defined contribution preferences

Occupational pension funds

From Corporatism to Public Utilities: Workplace Pensions in the 21st Century

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