Dealing with contradiction in a communicative context: A cross-cultural study

Henst, J.-B. van der; Mercier, Hugo; Yama, Hiroshi; Kawasaki, Yayoi; Adachi, Kuniko

doi:10.1515/ip.2006.029

Cited by 21 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…He argues that Nisbett's Eastern subjects have given less analytic-and more shallow-responses because these subject pools happened to be less interested in Nisbett's tasks (Mercier, 2011). There is evidence that differences are not found when care is taken to ensure that motivation is uniform: for example, even just imagining that one has a stake in some issue under contention can suffice to erase cultural differences in reasoning between Eastern (Japanese) and Western (French) subjects (Van der Henst, Mercier, Yama, Kawasaki, & Adachi, 2006). when it is presented following a very clear case of ignorance than when it follows a very clear case of knowledge (Swain et al, 2008;Wright, 2010).…”

Section: Intuitive Mindreading Amateur and Professionalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology

Nagel

2012

Philos Phenomenol Research

207

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Section: Intuitive Mindreading Amateur and Professionalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology

Nagel

2012

Philos Phenomenol Research

207

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“…The difference that was observed in Peng & Nisbett (1999), however, seems to be the result of a confound, and has proven hard to replicate (Friedman, Chen, & Vaid, 2006). Yama, Kawasaki, & Adachi, submitted; Van der Henst, Mercier, Yama, Kawasaki, & Adachi, 2007). So generalizing from these two, arguably very tendentious, examples does not seem to be warranted, especially as "cultural group differences in conflict style have not always replicated across studies; high within--group variance often swamps between--group variance" (Fu et al, 2007, p.191).…”

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confidence: 99%

On the Universality of Argumentative Reasoning

Mercier

2011

J Cogn Cult

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According to the argumentative theory of reasoning, humans have evolved reasoning abilities (usually known as 'system 2' or 'analytic' reasoning) for argumentative purposes. This implies that some reasoning skills should be universals. Such a claim seems to be at odd with findings from cross-cultural research. First, a wealth of research, following the work of Luria, has shown apparent difficulties for illiterate populations to solve simple but abstract syllogisms. It can be shown, however, that once they are willing to accept the pragmatics of the task, these participants can perform at or near ceiling. Second, historical, sociological and anthropological research has been used to claim that some Eastern cultures have not developed argumentation. These claims are the result of oversimplifications and of a selective view of the data. A closer looks reveals instead very elaborate forms of argumentation, in Chinese culture particularly. Third, cross-cultural psychologists have carried out an extensive research program aimed at showing that Easterners do not rely on the principle of non-contradiction and that they use holistic rather than analytic thinking. A review of these experiments shows that no qualitative difference emerges in the way Easterners and Westerners deal with argumentation and that in the proper context both populations can easily have recourse to holistic or analytic thinking. It is possible to conclude from this critical review that the reasoning skills involved in argumentation seem to be universal even though they can be used in different ways in various cultural contexts. 2Abstract. According to the argumentative theory of reasoning, humans have evolved reasoning abilities (usually known as 'system 2' or 'analytic' reasoning) for argumentative purposes. This implies that some reasoning skills should be universals. Such a claim seems to be at odd with findings from cross--cultural research. First, a wealth of research, following the work of Luria, has shown apparent difficulties for illiterate populations to solve simple but abstract syllogisms. It can be shown however that once they are willing to accept the pragmatics of the task, these participants can perform at or near ceiling. Second, historical, sociological and anthropological research has been used to claim that some Eastern cultures have not developed argumentation. These claims are the result of oversimplifications and of a selective view of the data. A closer looks reveals instead very elaborate forms of argumentation, in Chinese culture particularly. Third, cross--cultural psychologists have carried out an extensive research program aimed at showing that Easterners do not rely on the principle of non--contradiction and that they use holistic rather than analytic thinking. A review of these experiments shows that no qualitative difference emerges in the way Easterners and Westerners deal with argumentation and that in the proper context both populations can easily have recourse to holistic or analytic thinking. It is possi...

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“…Huss (2004) found that the taste of Easterners and Westerners in matters of proverbs was more strongly influenced by esthetic considerations than by their support for compromise, offering an alternative interpretation to Peng and Nisbett's results. Van der Henst et al showed that when given a simple choice between sticking with a position they had been arbitrarily provided with and following an advice, both French and Japanese participants preferred to stick to their position (Van der Henst et al, 2007). Based on an analysis of historical evidence, Mercier (2011) questioned the conclusion drawn by Peng and Nisbett (1999) that Easterners were particularly prone to choose the 'middle way'.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is the Use of Averaging in Advice Taking Modulated by Culture?

Mercier

Yama

Kawasaki

et al. 2012

Journal of Cognition and Culture

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Many recent experiments have explored the way people take advice into account. It has been observed that in so doing participants often rely on one of the two following strategies: averaging between the different opinions or choosing one of the opinions, as opposed to using more complex weighting strategies. While several factors that affect strategy choice have been investigated, no attention has been paid to potential cultural variations. Among the many relevant cross-cultural differences, results have show that Easterners tend to favor compromise more than Westerners, a difference that could translate into a greater preference for averaging in Eastern population. In Experiment 1, we confronted Japanese and French participants to two pieces of advice and asked them to form an aggregate answer. In Experiment 2, participants had to aggregate their own opinion and a piece of advice. In neither of the experiments were the Japanese more likely to use averaging than the French. Explanations for this robust absence of difference are suggested. The only difference that emerged was that the Japanese were more likely to choose the advice and less likely to choose their own answer than the French. Different interpretations of this result are discussed, including the possibility that it is an artefact of a theoretically irrelevant difference between the populations under study.

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Dealing with contradiction in a communicative context: A cross-cultural study

Cited by 21 publications

References 15 publications

Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology

Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology

On the Universality of Argumentative Reasoning

Is the Use of Averaging in Advice Taking Modulated by Culture?

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