Dealing with populists in government: a framework for analysis

Abstract

There is growing research on populist actors and their impact on the democratic system, but little has been written on how to deal with populist actors in government. To respond to this question, in this article we develop a theoretical framework that distinguishes three levels of analysis. First, we identify the set of domestic and external actors that can try to cope with the coming into power of populist forces. Second, we offer an overview of the different strategies that can be employed to react against populist actors in government. Third, we argue that it is important to consider the timing of the reactions. In addition, we also present a brief summary of the articles that are part of this special issue.

Is Nationalism or Ethnopopulism on the Rise Today?

“…2. The vertical axis in Figure 1 juxtaposes populism (which holds that only the majority should rule) against liberalism, which argues for a rule-of-law system that continually adjudicates among competing political interests (Müller, 2016;Hawkins, 2010;Kaltwasser & Taggart, 2016).…”

Dealing with populists in government: some comparative conclusions

“…5 Although the framework drew from the considerable work on reacting to the phenomenon of political extremism, our perspective is distinct in that we are focusing on the moment that populists attain power and move from being outsiders to being insiders -and often insiders with real power. This certainly changes the game fundamentally.…”

Varieties of populism and the challenges to Global Constitutionalism: Dangers, promises and implications

“…However, the rise of populism may be more complex and ambiguous for GC than its authoritarian and nationalist incarnations suggest. Indeed, at the domestic level, a long-standing debate has considered populism's relationship to constitutional principles as 'two-faced' (Canovan 1999) and 'ambiguous' (Mény and Surel 2002), depending on the state of liberal democratic politics and the responses of other parties, institutions and voters (Arditi 2005;Rovira Kaltwasser and Taggart 2016;Bonikowski 2017). Precariously, pure populist majoritarianism is inconsistent with liberal democratic principles, but such regimes nonetheless rely on majoritarian rule to be legitimate (Berman 2017;Mounk 2018).…”

“…Politicisation may influence decision-making and global institutional outcomes, but it is conditional on vote choices and the political supply-side of party systems including mainstream parties, political opportunity structures and institutional fora of political decision-making (Kriesi 2012). Even when in power, the preferences of voters, behaviour of mainstream parties and reactions of domestic and international institutions remain key factors with the potential to stop or alter the direction and magnitude of any impact populist ideology may have (see Rovira Kaltwasser and Taggart 2016). Institutional outcomes of GC may thus be more differentiated than in functional processes driven through the more homogeneous international legal and political system itself.…”