Dealing with the Past: Pro-State Paramilitaries, Truth and Transition in Northern Ireland

Abstract

One promise of formal truth recovery processes, such as truth commissions, in transitional societies is that they present the possibility of a common narrative emerging about the causes of conflict. At the same time, there is now evidence that such processes also create silences; some narratives are not fully represented. One such silence is in relation to pro-state paramilitaries. Drawing extensively on interviews with a number of loyalist paramilitary activists in Northern Ireland, as well as others attuned to the current state of loyalism, this article explores loyalist paramilitary attitudes to dealing with the past, and in particular, the possibility of a truth commission for Northern Ireland. It considers the reasons for loyalist reticence about supporting such a commission, including their belief that the call for truth serves a republican insurgent agenda, their conviction that they have been abandoned by the state to which they have been loyal, and a general sense of confused political identity within loyalism. Finally, the article considers some ways in which loyalists might be persuaded to engage in a truth recovery process, not least through an attempt to produce a tighter definition of truth. If their narrative succeeds in being properly represented, there may be lessons to be learned for similar transitional societies.

Social Immobility, Ethno-politics, and Sectarian Violence: Obstacles to Post-conflict Reconstruction in Northern Ireland

“…The Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defense Association (UDA) were established in 1966 and 1971, respectively, and engaged in titfor-tat killings and bombings with the IRA up to the formerly declared ceasefires of 1994 (Shirlow 2012). Unlike middle-class unionism, whose sense of superiority over republicans corresponded in part with belief in the state's moral monopoly of the use of force, loyalists feel that they had (and have) the right to engage in extra-state political violence in order to respond to IRA attacks and preserve the province of Ulster (Rolston 2006). Victims of loyalist paramilitary terrorism were overwhelmingly civilian, while the IRA was responsible for the largest overall number of casualties when combining soldiers, RUC officers, and civilians in the count (Shirlow 2012).…”

“…That money is then controlled through councils and obviously the decision is political so… A political organization like this, we're in serious risk of disappearing because of that. 3 Finally, unionist support for policies which permanently criminalize and marginalize former paramilitary prisoners (Rolston 2006;Shirlow 2012), in line with their intention to punish "the IRA" and Sinn Fein, undermines the efficacy of community-based ex-combatant reintegration efforts. 4 Certain elements within the loyalist and republican ex-prisoner communities, with few job prospects and limited social legitimacy (Mitchell 2008) -and who witness the stagnation of their communities amid shifts toward neoliberal modes of "development" -may feel inclined to ratchet-up political hostilities, as findings reported in chapter four suggest.…”

“…Amnesty was ultimately necessary at the time in order to ensure that paramilitaries on both sides committed to the peace process. Yet no comprehensive mechanism for dealing with the violence of the past was implemented, and many former paramilitary combatants remain disenfranchised as a result of punitive, exclusionary policies which limit options for employment, social entitlements, and travel (Rolston 2006;Ritchie 2002). Somewhat paradoxically, in a likely attempt to cushion the effect of ex-prisoner disenfranchisement, government grants have at the same time continued to support paramilitary-linked organizations, such as the Ulster Political Research Group, setting aside "3.5 million" pounds for "unemployed, disbanded UDA men," among others (Hughes et al 2007:48).…”

“…This was partially due to skepticism about the true objectives of any formal transitional justice mechanism among loyalists especially, who felt they had little to gain in a situation in which nationalists were interpreted as more powerful in framing discourse about the past in support of their ideological and constitutional agenda (Rolston 2006). …”

“…Unlike Sinn Fein, with many of their elected officials being former Irish Republican Army (IRA) associates -coming from, and often still residing within, relatively deprived working-class communitiesmost unionist politicians come from middle-class areas less affected by legacies of conflict. At the same time, loyalist paramilitary prisoners are generally treated as pariahs by middle-class unionism; the latter has historically believed in the state's monopoly over the use of "legitimate" violence, corresponding not only to their claims of moral superiority over republicans, but also their disdain for loyalist paramilitarism (Rolston 2006;Shirlow 2012). Not coincidentally, the impacts of "progressive" elements which do exist within the Protestant community have been minimal.…”