Death, Deprivation, and a Sartrean Account of Horror

Abstract

Deprivation offers a plausible explanation for the badness of death, so fear is not unreasonable. But horror at the prospect of one's death is not just extreme fear because horror is structurally different than fear. Horror requires a different explanation. For Sartre, horror is possible only in unique circumstances. I argue that Sartre's view, when combined with the subjective incomprehensibility of one's annihilation, can explain horror and other negative emotions that are not contingent on deprivation. Further, I argue that while fear can be reasonable if one's death will deprive, Lucretius's Symmetry Argument shows that horror is unreasonable.

Rationally Facing Death: Fear and Other Alternatives

“…Frederik Kaufman (2022) is similarly struck by how the prospect of death induces a fear‐like state divorced from how death can be bad for us either in itself or insofar as it deprives us of greater lifetime well‐being. He dubs this state “horror,” and notes that it differs from fear in not being prompted by any expectation of our suffering some bad.…”

“…All the same, she notes that "the idea that we could have an egocentric fear of something that we do not consider bad for us is an uncomfortable result. " (2018:12) Frederik Kaufman (2022) is similarly struck by how the prospect of death induces a fear-like state divorced from how death can be bad for us either in itself or insofar as it deprives us of greater lifetime well-being. He dubs this state "horror," and notes that it differs from fear in not being prompted by any expectation of our suffering some bad.…”