2017
DOI: 10.1017/9781316416303
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Debating Humanity

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Cited by 53 publications
(40 citation statements)
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“…First , even though their writing is often clearly critical of many things, for example, sexism and racism, and in favour or others, such as inclusiveness and democracy, sociologists are generally wary of talk of virtues and vices, perhaps regarding it as a form of repressive moralizing, with suspicions extending to ‘flourishing’, ‘well-being’, morality and indeed normativity itself, as a restrictive ‘normalizing’ of behaviour. There is also a common aversion to any kind of naturalism, humanism or universalism that might imply that some things are good or bad for us simply as human beings, notwithstanding cultural variation (Chernilo, 2014, 2017; Sayer, 2011). This may be based on fear of ethnocentrism but as Mary Midgley (2003: 54) said, ‘You cannot have a plant or an animal without certain quite definite things being good and bad for it.’ To be sure, we have differently cultivated natures, but then for it to be possible for us to exhibit so much cultural variation, we must have a common susceptibility to socialization.…”
Section: Rescuing Charactermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…First , even though their writing is often clearly critical of many things, for example, sexism and racism, and in favour or others, such as inclusiveness and democracy, sociologists are generally wary of talk of virtues and vices, perhaps regarding it as a form of repressive moralizing, with suspicions extending to ‘flourishing’, ‘well-being’, morality and indeed normativity itself, as a restrictive ‘normalizing’ of behaviour. There is also a common aversion to any kind of naturalism, humanism or universalism that might imply that some things are good or bad for us simply as human beings, notwithstanding cultural variation (Chernilo, 2014, 2017; Sayer, 2011). This may be based on fear of ethnocentrism but as Mary Midgley (2003: 54) said, ‘You cannot have a plant or an animal without certain quite definite things being good and bad for it.’ To be sure, we have differently cultivated natures, but then for it to be possible for us to exhibit so much cultural variation, we must have a common susceptibility to socialization.…”
Section: Rescuing Charactermentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The idea of philosophical sociology that I have been developing over the past few years focuses on the need to articulate those, mostly implicit, conceptions of the human, humanity and human nature that are central to our understanding of social life (Chernilo, 2014, 2017). I call it philosophical sociology in order to highlight two main arguments.…”
Section: Philosophical Sociologymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…I should like my contribution to this special issue to focus on a different set of concerns. In the past few years, and under the banner of ‘philosophical sociology’, I have been arguing that we require a more thorough understanding of the – often implicit – ideas of the human, humanity, and even human nature that underpin both political and social-scientific debates (Chernilo, 2014, 2017). The sociological purchase of looking at these implicit ideas of the human, I contend, lies in the fact that they are the ones giving content to normative ideas in society, such as justice, solidarity and autonomy.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
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