2002
DOI: 10.1093/ejil/13.1.63
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Debating the Law of Sanctions

Abstract: After years of United Nations-mandated sanctions against Iraq, human rights advocates began charging the UN Security Council with genocide in its use of 'sanctions of mass destruction'. Following the charges, a full debate began on the law of sanctions. The article recounts this debate, setting it in the context of two earlier rounds of discussion on the lawful use of sanctions. Those earlier debates resulted in general consensus that the Security Council was both free to use sanctions whenever it wanted and t… Show more

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Cited by 38 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…128 Despite the significant impact on the human rights of the peoples of Iraq, it has been argued that human rights laws are inapplicable to those sanctions given that, even if they bind the UN as an inter-governmental organization possessing international legal personality as a matter of customary law, there was no intention by the Security Council to violate those rights. 129 On the understanding that the Security Council did not intend to violate the rights of the Iraqi people, and, furthermore, that it is necessary to show intent to establish that it had violated international law in this regard, 130 it still should have foreseen the possibility and, therefore at the very least, it had obligations of due diligence to do all in its power to prevent human rights violations that are likely to result from its actions. 131 The often-violative nature of unilateral sanctions that go beyond temporary and proportionate countermeasures is shown by the US embargo of Cuba first imposed 1962 in response to Cuba's nationalization of US property and businesses, but tightened considerably with the fall of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of its support for Cuba in 1991 (meaning an immediate loss of 75-80% of Cuban trade), 132 by its incorporation in legislation in the form of the Torricelli and Helms-Burton Acts of 1992 and 1996 respectively.…”
Section: Sanctions As Violations Of International Lawmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…128 Despite the significant impact on the human rights of the peoples of Iraq, it has been argued that human rights laws are inapplicable to those sanctions given that, even if they bind the UN as an inter-governmental organization possessing international legal personality as a matter of customary law, there was no intention by the Security Council to violate those rights. 129 On the understanding that the Security Council did not intend to violate the rights of the Iraqi people, and, furthermore, that it is necessary to show intent to establish that it had violated international law in this regard, 130 it still should have foreseen the possibility and, therefore at the very least, it had obligations of due diligence to do all in its power to prevent human rights violations that are likely to result from its actions. 131 The often-violative nature of unilateral sanctions that go beyond temporary and proportionate countermeasures is shown by the US embargo of Cuba first imposed 1962 in response to Cuba's nationalization of US property and businesses, but tightened considerably with the fall of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of its support for Cuba in 1991 (meaning an immediate loss of 75-80% of Cuban trade), 132 by its incorporation in legislation in the form of the Torricelli and Helms-Burton Acts of 1992 and 1996 respectively.…”
Section: Sanctions As Violations Of International Lawmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…69 The Council's response may be more influential than States acting in self-defense can do because the Council may respond to mere threats, and not just 'armed attacks.' 70…”
Section: A Security Council's Authorization For the Use Of Forcementioning
confidence: 99%