2000
DOI: 10.1093/rfs/13.4.1057
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Debt Valuation, Renegotiation, and Optimal Dividend Policy

Abstract: The valuation of debt and equity, reorganization boundaries, and firm's optimal dividend policies are studied in a framework where we model strategic interactions between debt holders and equity holders in a game-theoretic setting which can accommodate varying bargaining powers to the two claimants. Two formulations of reorganization are presented: debt-equity swaps and strategic debt service resulting from negotiated debt service reductions. We study the effects of bond covenants on payout policies and distin… Show more

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Cited by 397 publications
(438 citation statements)
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“…These equations hold for situations in which (i) default leads to an immediate liquidation of the firm's assets or (ii) shareholders have no bargaining power and hence do not extract any surplus from renegotiation. When and renegotiation is costless ( ), equations (11) and (12) are d r ϩϱ J p 0 similar to those provided by Fan and Sundaresan (2000) where default never leads to liquidation.…”
Section: ϫYmentioning
confidence: 83%
“…These equations hold for situations in which (i) default leads to an immediate liquidation of the firm's assets or (ii) shareholders have no bargaining power and hence do not extract any surplus from renegotiation. When and renegotiation is costless ( ), equations (11) and (12) are d r ϩϱ J p 0 similar to those provided by Fan and Sundaresan (2000) where default never leads to liquidation.…”
Section: ϫYmentioning
confidence: 83%
“…This paper extends the contingent-claims model of Fan and Sundaresan (2000) to account for this evidence, and derives testable implications on how these features relate to expected stock returns.…”
Section: Model and Predictionsmentioning
confidence: 87%
“…Mella-Barral (1999) study private debt renegotiations when shareholders and creditors can alternatively make takeit-or-leave-it o¤ers. Fan and Sundaresan (2000) view renegotiations as a cooperative Nash bargaining game in which claimholders maximize renegotiations surplus to avoid costly liquidation. However, the assumption of a cooperative game for renegotiations may be harder to sustain for Chapter 11.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…by backward induction from the last negotiation round, using (21), (16) and (17). Since the state space of the dynamic program is continuous, the …rst step is to partition it into a collection of convex subsets, and obtain a corresponding …nite set of grid points where the value functions are to be evaluated.…”
Section: Appendix B: Numerical Implementationmentioning
confidence: 99%