Debunking morality: evolutionary naturalism and moral error theory

Lillehammer, Hallvard

doi:10.1023/a:1025568525832

Cited by 24 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…6 Evolutionary moral-debunking arguments have been advanced in one form or another by Ruse 1 986, chap. 3;Lillehammer 2003;Kitcher 2005, sec. 4;Joyce 2006;Street 2006; Wilkins and Griffiths 201 2, sec.…”

Section: Debunking Arguments In Metaethics and Metaphysicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Debunking Arguments in Metaethics and Metaphysics

Korman¹

2019

Metaphysics and Cognitive Science

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Evolutionary debunking arguments abound, but it is widely assumed that they do not arise for our perceptual beliefs about midsized objects, insofar as the adaptive value of our object beliefs cannot be explained without reference to the objects themselves. This chapter argues that this is a mistake. Just as with moral beliefs, the adaptive value of our object beliefs can be explained without assuming that the beliefs are accurate. The chapter then explores the prospects for another sort of vindication of our object beliefs—which involves “bootstrapping” from our experiences of midsized objects—and defends bootstrapping maneuvers against a variety of objections. Finally, an explanatory constraint on bootstrapping is articulated and defended, and a variety of attempts to respond to debunking arguments are shown to run afoul of the constraint.

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Section: Debunking Arguments In Metaethics and Metaphysicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Debunking Arguments in Metaethics and Metaphysics

Korman¹

2019

Metaphysics and Cognitive Science

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“…For further discussion of the implications of this point, see e.g. Lillehammer (2003) and Street (2006).…”

Section: B Indeterminacymentioning

confidence: 99%

Projection, Indeterminacy and Moral Skepticism

Lillehammer¹

2017

Moral Skepticism

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According to one way of understanding moral skepticism, to be a skeptic about morality is to hold that all moral claims are either false, incoherent, or something else misleadingly expressed. This tripartite disjunctive formulation is due to Bernard Williams, who made this claim about attributions to agents of reasons for action said to obtain regardless of the contents of their desires, and hence about any moral reasons so said to obtain (Williams 1981). Williams's formulation (although not his entire view) broadly captures the central claims of other recent proponents of moral skepticism, such as John Mackie (1977), Richard Joyce (2001), and Jonas Olson (2014)-also commonly known as 'moral error theorists'. In what follows, I use the terms 'moral skepticism' and 'moral error theory' interchangeably. According to moral error theory, morality is something invented, constructed or made; but mistakenly presents itself to us as if it were an independent object of discovery. According to moral constructivism, morality is something invented, constructed or made. 1 Thus understood, error theory and constructivism are close philosophical relatives (Lillehammer 2011). Both types of view take morality to be a construction. But error theorists go further than constructivists in claiming that moral thought necessarily, or 'constitutively', presents itself as something different, or 'more' than that, namely, a cognitive reflection of a moral reality that 1 I intend this characterization of constructivism and error theory to be consistent with the claim that significant aspects of the human moral sensibility are a product of evolutionary and other non-intentional causes (see e.g. Lillehammer 2003). I mainly ignore this complication in what follows.

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“…Fourth, our existing moral sensibility, whether embodied in the form of ethical principles or particular judgements, has been (and continues to be) subject to continuous reflective updating in response to new information about the natural and social world, including information about the nature and origins of the moral faculty itself (c.f. Lillehammer 2003). No doubt it is reasonable to think that an improved understanding of the natural origins of our ethical beliefs would put into question some deeply treasured yet grossly prejudiced aspects of different systems of human morality (c.f.…”

Section: Living With Contingencymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, I will show that Sidgwick's theoretical framework illuminates the philosophical Footnote 1 continued him or herself) that may be associated with holding any individual ethical belief. For further discussion of the issues mentioned in (1) and (2), see Lillehammer (2003) and Street (2006). 2 The reference to Mandeville is apposite in the context of Darwin's appeal to an imaginary example of human beings 'reared under precisely the same condition as bee-hives' (Darwin 2004, 122).…”

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Methods of ethics and the descent of man: Darwin and Sidgwick on ethics and evolution

Lillehammer

2010

Biol Philos

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Darwin's treatment of morality in The Descent of Man has generated a wide variety of responses among moral philosophers. Among these is the dismissal of evolution as irrelevant to ethics by Darwin's contemporary Henry Sidgwick; the last, and arguably the greatest, of the Nineteenth Century British Utilitarians. This paper offers a re-examination of Sidgwick's response to evolutionary considerations as irrelevant to ethics and the absence of any engagement with Darwin's work in Sidgwick's main ethical treatise, The Methods of Ethics. This assessment of Sidgwick's response to Darwin's work is shown to have significance for a number of ongoing controversies in contemporary metaethics.

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Debunking morality: evolutionary naturalism and moral error theory

Cited by 24 publications

References 15 publications

Debunking Arguments in Metaethics and Metaphysics

Debunking Arguments in Metaethics and Metaphysics

Projection, Indeterminacy and Moral Skepticism

Methods of ethics and the descent of man: Darwin and Sidgwick on ethics and evolution

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