Decentralisation as authoritarian upgrading? Evidence from Jordan and Morocco

Abstract

A vivid regional and international debate on the significance of local politics and the respective actors came back to life after the Arab uprisings in 2011, which initiated decentralisation reforms in several MENA countries. Decentralisation advocates expect the reforms to foster democratisation, local autonomy and the overall socioeconomic situation, but Middle Eastern regimes also engage in decentralisation reforms for the sake of their own durability. This article assesses the potential of decentralisation reforms to develop mechanisms that contribute to authoritarian upgrading. We systematically include subnational politics and dynamics, as they are essential for deepening our understanding of the potential for reforms to uphold non-democratic regimes. Decentralisation is a promising test case, as the delegation of power away from the centre towards subnational actors and institutions affects the regime's ability to control the polity. In our analysis, we focus on three salient aspects that influence the outcome of a decentralisation reform: (1) the legal outline of decentralisation, (2) its financial organisation as well as ( 3) the management of central, regional, and local elite networks. Subnational authoritarian upgrading via decentralisation reforms in Jordan and Morocco seem to focus on the satisfaction and containment of civil society as well as on the management and control of elites and oppositional actors.

2. Conceptualizing Decentralization and the History of Statehood in the Middle East and North Africa

“…We go beyond normative assumptions that decentralization is a necessary precondition or even a booster for democratization: Western donors, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, as well as local civil society activists have been encouraging decentralization reforms for decades. They expected decentralization to enhance local autonomy, democracy, accountability and the overall socioeconomic situation of a country (for this perspective see chapter 6; see also Vollmann et al 2020). However, one decade after the Arab uprisings began, only Tunisia managed to continue down the bumpy path of democratic consolidation with numerous stress factors still to come (see Demmelhuber 2018).…”

“…Decentralization can upgrade as well as downgrade and/or challenge authoritarian rule (see Vollmann et al 2020). On the other hand, despite a consistently high number of resilient autocracies both in the MENA (see Kneuer and Demmelhuber 2021) and worldwide (see Lührmann and Lindberg 2019), decentralization has been in vogue as a political reform initiative for more than three decades.…”

4. Untangling Elite Networks and Decentralization in the Middle East and North Africa: Neopatrimonialism Revisited

“…The regime relies on the support of well-connected elites and their clients for the formulation and implementation of politics, and builds on their resources and capabilities to form a basis of support for the regime. Accordingly, the cooptation and management of elites are vital strategies of both authoritarian and neopatrimonial regimes (Gerschewski 2013;Heydemann 2007;Vollmann et al 2020;Hinnebusch 2012;Aalen and Murias 2018). Since central patron-client networks usually reach to the local level, decentralization challenges both the structure and the rules of existing patron-client-relationships as well as the formal institutional landscape they are embedded in.…”

“…Hence, decentralization reforms may offer additional incentives for political participation and contestation. At the same time, the newly established competition may also be part of the regime's strategy to balance power relations between elites on all levels of government, as new struggles for influence and resource distribution between different institutions emerge (see also Vollmann et al 2020).…”

“…The center, however, used it to reinforce the ties between the monarchy and the early-independence Moroccan tribes. They were thus integrated into the official state structure, but the bureaucratic selection logic and chain of command from the MoI replaced the tribal origins over time (Charrad 2011;Vollmann et al 2020;Bouabid and Iraki 2015;Venema and Mguild 2002).…”