Decentralised Beneficiary Targeting in Large-Scale Development Programmes: Insights from the Malawi Farm Input Subsidy Programme

Kilic, Talip; Whitney, Edward; Winters, Paul

doi:10.1093/jae/eju021

Cited by 47 publications

(25 citation statements)

References 16 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Like other studies, our findings also suggest that those in positions of power at the local level were more likely to obtain benefits (e.g., Pan and Christianson 2012; Kilic, Whitney, and Winters 2015)…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 86%

“…Consistent with findings by other scholars (e.g., Chirwa and Dorward 2013; Kilic, Whitney, and Winters 2015), we fail to find evidence that Malawi's AISP effectively targeted those with greatest need, despite the program's stated goal of reaching those most at risk for food insecurity. Our results show that neither poorer respondents, nor those with smaller land holdings were more likely to receive the subsidy.…”

Section: Was the Program Targeted?supporting

confidence: 82%

“…Beyond political factors, prior studies in Malawi also provide evidence of targeting towards households with greater resources such as wealth or landholdings (Chirwa and Dorward 2013; Kilic, Whitney, and Winters 2015), greater educational attainment by the household head (Kilic, Whitney, and Winters 2015), or having a male household head (Chibwana, Fisher, and Shively 2012). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The Political Effects of Agricultural Subsidies in Africa: Evidence from Malawi

Dionne

Horowitz

2016

World Development

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Across sub-Saharan Africa agricultural subsidy programs have again become a common strategy for combatting rural poverty, increasing agricultural production, and reducing food insecurity. Despite a large literature examining subsidies' effects on output and welfare, little is known about their political effects. This paper examines Malawi's Agricultural Input Subsidy Programme, one of the largest and most expensive programs implemented, which was launched by the government in 2005. We examine whether the incumbent party, the Democratic Progressive Party headed by president Bingu wa Mutharika, benefited from Malawi's subsidy program by examining a longitudinal dataset of 1,846 rural Malawians interviewed in 2008 and again in 2010. The individual-level data show no evidence that the subsidy program was targeted to Mutharika's co-ethnics or co-partisans. Our analysis further demonstrates that the subsidy program increased support for the incumbent party. These results suggest that even when parties are unable or unwilling to target distributional programs at the local level, they may nonetheless derive political benefits. As anti-poverty programs – including agricultural subsidies to small-scale farmers – become increasingly common across the continent, our results suggest that they may help to explain patterns of party affiliation and vote choice, particularly where traditional patterns of partisan affiliation related to ethnic or regional identities weaken.

show abstract

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 86%

Section: Was the Program Targeted?supporting

confidence: 82%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The Political Effects of Agricultural Subsidies in Africa: Evidence from Malawi

Dionne

Horowitz

2016

World Development

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…These criteria remain broad and there are variations in the use of the targeting guidelines in different communities, particularly as the number of eligible households tends to be much larger than the available number of fertiliser coupons. Kilic, Whitney, and Winters (2013) find that FISP does not exclusively target the poor in Malawi. On the contrary, it primarily reaches the middle of the income distribution.…”

Section: Farm Input Subsidy Programmementioning

confidence: 76%

“…Notes 1. Kilic et al (2013) explain that the limited pro-poor targeting stems from community-based targeting (that is open forums in which village residents identify beneficiaries in a collective fashion) that are co-opted by more influential community members. Their analysis suggests that, on average, households that are relatively well-off, connected to community leadership, and residing in agro-ecologically favourable locations are more likely to be FISP beneficiaries and receive more input coupons.…”

Section: Disclosure Statementmentioning

confidence: 99%

One Plus One can be Greater than Two: Evaluating Synergies of Development Programmes in Malawi

Pace

Daidone

Davis

et al. 2017

The Journal of Development Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper investigates the interplay between the Social Cash Transfer Programme (SCTP) and the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) in Malawi. We take advantage of data collected from a 17-month evaluation of a sample of households eligible to receive SCTP, which also provided information about inclusion into FISP. We estimate two types of synergies: i) the complementarity between SCTP and FISP, that is whether the impact of both interventions run together is larger than the sum of the impacts of these interventions when run separately, and ii) the incremental impact of receiving FISP when a household already receives SCTP, as well as the incremental impact of receiving SCTP when a household already receives FISP. The analysis shows that there are synergies between the two policy interventions, mainly in terms of incremental impacts of each programme over the other, in increasing expenditure, agricultural production and livestock.

show abstract

Political meddling in social assistance programme: Panel data evidence from India

Unnikrishnan

2022

J of Intl Development

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper examines the role of the horizontal and vertical network in aiding eligible individuals to receive Indira Gandhi National Old Age Pension Scheme. A vertical network refers to a household's political connection, and a horizontal network denotes the interconnectedness with others in the society. We have used data from all India representative individual level (2004-2005 and 2011-2012) panel data released by the India Human Development Survey. Our estimated results from the individual level fixed effects model suggest that programme eligible individuals with vertical networks have a higher probability of receiving the programme. Sub-sample heterogeneities are detailed in the paper.

show abstract

Decentralised Beneficiary Targeting in Large-Scale Development Programmes: Insights from the Malawi Farm Input Subsidy Programme

Cited by 47 publications

References 16 publications

The Political Effects of Agricultural Subsidies in Africa: Evidence from Malawi

The Political Effects of Agricultural Subsidies in Africa: Evidence from Malawi

One Plus One can be Greater than Two: Evaluating Synergies of Development Programmes in Malawi

Political meddling in social assistance programme: Panel data evidence from India

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About