Decentralization and political career concerns

Che, Jiahua; Chung, Kim-Sau; Lu, Yang

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.11.017

Cited by 27 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Both L i and Y i are increasing in A i and decreasing in . 6 Our results are robust to other values of > 0; see Appendix B. 7 Our results are robust to a more general quasi-linear utility function…”

Section: Individuals With Heterogeneous Abilitiesmentioning

confidence: 59%

“…For simplicity, we set to 0.5. 6 Given that we will consider the utilitarian social welfare function, we specify a quasi-linear utility function for individual i:…”

Section: Individuals With Heterogeneous Abilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Given A e A m , (10) implies that e m < 0:5; see Figure 1. Then, use (5) and (6) to show that L( e ) L( m ) and Y ( e ) Y ( m ), where L R 1 0 L i di and Y R 1 0 Y i di. Finally, use (7) to show that G( e ) G( m ).…”

Section: Proof Of Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this literature, Che and Qian (1998) model the advantages of local government ownership of …rms (over private ownership and state ownership) in order to explain its importance during the transition of the Chinese economy towards a market economy. Che et al (2017) show that self-serving autocratic leaders may choose a more optimal degree of decentralization than democratic voters and correct an ine¢ciency in democracy. Che et al…”

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confidence: 93%

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An economic analysis of political meritocracy

Chu¹,

Kou

Wang

2022

Economic Modelling

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The political system in China is often referred to as political meritocracy. This study develops a simple model of political economy to explore the strengths and weaknesses of a meritocratic system (in which political meritocrats design economic policies) relative to a democratic system (dominated by the median voter). We …nd that political meritocrats would choose economic policies that are more conducive to economic activities and lead to higher income but less public goods. Whether the meritocratic or democratic equilibrium achieves a higher level of social welfare depends on the distribution of individuals' abilities. If the ability of the median voter is lower than the mean of the population, then the meritocratic equilibrium may achieve a higher level of social welfare than the democratic equilibrium. In this case, there is a threshold degree of political inclusiveness in the meritocratic system above which political meritocracy dominates democracy in terms of social welfare, and this threshold degree of political inclusiveness is increasing in the ability of the median voter.

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Section: Individuals With Heterogeneous Abilitiesmentioning

confidence: 59%

“…For simplicity, we set to 0.5. 6 Given that we will consider the utilitarian social welfare function, we specify a quasi-linear utility function for individual i:…”

Section: Individuals With Heterogeneous Abilitiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Proof Of Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 93%

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An economic analysis of political meritocracy

Chu¹,

Kou

Wang

2022

Economic Modelling

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“…Third, echoing the insight in Che et al. (2017), the virtuous cycle relies on an intermediate level of decentralization. If authorities are too concentrated at the top of the government, the temptation of self‐dealing will be too strong for leaders, overwhelming their selection concerns.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 64%

Career Concerns, Beijing Style

Che

Chung

Qiao

2021

Int Economic Review

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The China model is increasingly viewed by developing countries as a viable alternative to democracy. China's allegedly merit‐based promotion system is lauded as a secret ingredient of the China model. However, once being promoted to the top, Chinese leaders are as unconstrained as other autocrats. If there are fundamental reasons why other autocrats cannot commit to such a promotion system, why are Chinese leaders any different? We provide a unified theory that accommodates both China and other autocracies by postulating that they coordinate on different equilibria. Both the presence and the absence of political career concerns can arise in equilibrium.

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Economic growth target, distortion of public expenditure and business cycle in China

Liu

Chen

et al. 2020

China Economic Review

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Decentralization and political career concerns

Cited by 27 publications

References 33 publications

An economic analysis of political meritocracy

An economic analysis of political meritocracy

Career Concerns, Beijing Style

Economic growth target, distortion of public expenditure and business cycle in China

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