1999
DOI: 10.1007/s001990050242
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Decentralized computation procurement and computational robustness in a smart market

Abstract: Summary. Several`smart market' mechanisms have recently appeared in the literature. These mechanisms combine a computer network that collects bids from agents with a central computer that selects a schedule of bids to ®ll based upon maximization of revenue or trading surplus. Potential problems exist when this optimization involves combinatorial diculty sucient to overwhelm the central computer. This paper explores the use of a computation procuring clock auction to induce human agents to approximate the solut… Show more

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Cited by 39 publications
(25 citation statements)
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“…They are NP-hard [11] and have various applications [6,7,9,10]. Comprehensive reviews of different approaches to solve SP, WSP, and MSP are given in [2,8,17,19].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They are NP-hard [11] and have various applications [6,7,9,10]. Comprehensive reviews of different approaches to solve SP, WSP, and MSP are given in [2,8,17,19].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Combinatorial auctions are also used in many decentralized and agent-based scheduling problems (De Vries and Vohra, 2003;Cramton et al, 2006;Brewer, 1999). Wellman et al (2001) developed a distributed bidding protocol based on combinatorial and ascending auctions to propose a solution to a complex scheduling problem.…”
Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Complex, dynamic pricing/auction procedures sometimes put a computational burden on the price-takers/bidders and we need to design auction procedures in which players with limited computational power can do such things as determine minimal bid increases to transform losing bids to winning ones. (See for example [68]. )…”
Section: Bounded Rationality 24mentioning
confidence: 99%