Decentralized targeting of an antipoverty program

Galasso, Emanuela; Ravallion, Martin

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.01.002

Cited by 334 publications

(260 citation statements)

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“…But it is interesting to note that the smaller number of newer, typically quantitative studies that do examine the issue have found far more positive results. Hence decentralization makes government more responsive to local needs (Alderman 2000, Faguet 2004, Manor 1999, increases citizen satisfaction with local services (World Bank 1995), and helps government target poverty programs better (Galasso and Ravallion 2005).…”

Section: Public Accountability and Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decentralization and Governance

2014

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Section: Public Accountability and Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decentralization and Governance

2014

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“…One of the major results emerging from this literature is that the resource allocation process typically reflects the preferences of elite groups. In addition, more unequal communities do much worse, especially when there is a concentration of political, economic and social power in the hands of a few (Rosenzweig and Foster, 2003;Besley et al, 2005;Galasso and Ravaillon, 2005;Rao and Ibáñez, 2005;Bardhan et al, 2008;Araujo et al, 2008;Labonne and Chase, 2009). As pointed out by Mansuri and Rao (2012), Chap.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Elite capture through information distortion: A theoretical essay

Platteau

Somville

Wahhaj

2014

Journal of Development Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract We investigate donor-beneficiary relationships in participatory development programs, where (i) communities are heterogeneous and dominated by the local elite, (ii) the elite strategically propose a project to the donor, knowing that the latter has imperfect knowledge of the needs of the target population. We analyze how changes in the donor's outside option or information about the needs of the target population affect elite capture. Our central, paradoxical result is that a more attractive outside option, or a higher quality of donor's information may end up encouraging the local elite to propose a project that better matches their own preference rather than the preference of the grassroots. Moreover, in the case where the noise in the donor's information follows a normal distribution, we find that a better outside option generally decreases elite capture but improved information about the needs of the target population is likely to increase elite capture. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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“…Recent theoretical analysis suggests that inequality may affect targeting outcomes of social funds projects or anti-poverty transfer schemes by reducing the relative power of the intended beneficiaries (Galasso and Ravallion, 2004;Bardhan and Mookherjee, 1999 A detailed case study of the north Indian village of Palanpur provides one illustration of the manner in which local elites are able to appropriate for their own purposes resources and opportunities made available to the community as a whole through public provisioning.…”

Section: How Can Local Inequality Affect Welfare Outcomes?mentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Unequal Inequality of Poor Communities

Elbers¹,

Lanjouw²,

Mistiaen³

et al. 2004

Policy Research Working Papers

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Important differences exist between communities with respect to their needs, capacities and circumstances. As central governments are not able to discern these differences fully, they seek to achieve their policy objectives by relying on decentralized mechanisms that utilize local information. However, household and individual characteristics within communities can also vary substantially. A growing theoretical literature suggests that inequality within communities can influence policy outcomes, and that this influence could be harmful or helpful, depending on the circumstances. Empirical investigations into the impact of inequality have, to date, been held largely back by a lack of systematic evidence on community-level inequality. This paper uses household survey and population census data to estimate per capita consumption inequality within communities in three developing countries. Communities are found to vary markedly from one another in terms of the degree of inequality they exhibit. We also show that there should be no presumption that inequality is less severe in poor communities. We argue that the kind of community-level inequality estimates generated in this paper can be utilized in designing and evaluating decentralized antipoverty programs. IntroductionGovernments in developing countries commonly implement decentralized antipoverty programs that are designed to distribute assets or cash to individuals or households.In many such cases, the central government first distributes its poverty reduction budget to communities, and these are then left to decide how to allocate that budget across individuals.Social Funds projects provide a well-known example from the family of community based development (CBD) initiatives, in which poor communities are required to identify, apply for funding, design, implement and manage their projects (Mansuri and Rao, 2003 (2003) provides a recent attempt to proxy local inequality on the basis of easily observed correlates of household income.5 outcomes combining the detailed information available from a household survey with the large-scale representation of the population census. We suggest that meaningful estimates of income or expenditure inequality for small areas can be obtained for many countries on the basis of these techniques. Second, we show that there is great heterogeneity in inequality across these communities in each country. We find that this heterogeneity in local inequality levels is still present when we focus our attention on the poorest communities in rural areas. The combined implication of these findings is that information on local inequality is available for use by program implementers and that this information can help to categorize communities even after conditioning on local poverty and type of area. How Can Local Inequality Affect Welfare Outcomes?Mansuri and Rao ( A detailed case study of the north Indian village of Palanpur provides one illustration of the manner in which local elites are able to appropriate for their own purposes ...

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Decentralized targeting of an antipoverty program

Cited by 334 publications

References 20 publications

Decentralization and Governance

Decentralization and Governance

Elite capture through information distortion: A theoretical essay

On the Unequal Inequality of Poor Communities

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