Deception, Detection, Demeanor, and Truth Bias in Face-to-Face and Computer-Mediated Communication

Abstract

In an ultimatum game, participants were randomly assigned to the role of allocator or recipient and to interact face-to-face (FtF) or over computer text chat (computermediated communication [CMC]). The allocator was given money to divide. The recipient was unaware of the amount given, so the allocator could deceive the recipient. Perception of the allocator having a dishonest demeanor increased recipient suspicion of deception, but reduced detection accuracy for truths. Demeanor cues did not help detect deception. Recipients were better at detecting lies CMC than FtF. Overall, truth bias did not differ between CMC and FtF. Rates of deception did not differ between CMC and FtF, but type of deception marginally differed. There was more deceptive omission used in FtF and more deceptive commission (bald-faced lies) used in CMC. Results are discussed in terms of demeanor and truth bias.Most people are bad at detecting deception in deception experiments and have detection rates slightly above chance (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). This article uses an ultimatum game to examine how sender demeanor and truth bias affect suspicion and

Channel Choice, Justification of Deception, and Detection

“…For both the distributor and receiver, the first seven questions measured how well the participant knew their partner (e. g., “How often have you talked with your partner?”) (see Van Swol et al, ). The Cronbach's alpha was high (.81 for distributor and .84 for receiver), and the mean was used as a measure of partner familiarity.…”

“…However, when that sender then chooses to interact through text chat rather than face‐to‐face, this may act as a trigger or projected motive and heighten suspicion. While previous research comparing detection accuracy in online and face‐to‐face communication (Van Swol et al, ) found that receivers did not have a lie bias for online communication in comparison to face‐to‐face communication, the study assigned distributors to communication channel; thus there was no inferred intent for the sender who was communicating online. In this study, because the sender chooses which communication channel to make an offer, the receiver may attach meaning to the choice of communication channel (Sitkin, Sutcliffe, & Barrios‐Choplin, ) and be more suspicious of online communication.…”

“…The Cronbach's alpha was high (.81 for distributor and .84 for receiver), and the mean was used as a measure of partner familiarity. The distributor questionnaire included a 6‐item measure of Partner Suspicion (e.g., “My partner did not seem to believe my offer.”) from Van Swol et al (). For these six items (Van Swol et al, ), participants responded on a 1 True to 7 False scale.…”

“…The questionnaire for the distributor had 34 questions (shorter for CMC) and a 20‐item emotion PANAS‐style scale from Van Swol et al (), originally adapted from Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (); when the distributor communicated over the computer, there were no questions that asked about the receiver's behavior. The distributor was asked about her distribution of money, any deception she used in the interaction, and other items described below.…”

“…First, senders vary in their honest and dishonest demeanor, but these demeanor cues are often unrelated to actual honesty or deception. Demeanor cues are more numerous and salient face‐to‐face and, therefore, can impair accurate detection more in face‐to‐face interactions (Levine et al, ; Van Swol, Braun, & Kolb, ). Levine et al () categorize demeanor cues as honest or dishonest cues.…”