Deception tactics for network interdiction: A multiobjective approach

Abstract

This article develops defender-attacker network interdiction models with deception. Here, deception refers to a preemptive and intelligent use of concealed interdiction assets and decoys by the defender, in addition to transparent assets commonly employed in modeling defender-attacker problems. These models can help security planners to locate a limited number of checkpoints and sensors of various types to, for example, detect the smuggling of illegal products. The problem is complex, in part, because the objective functions of the defender and the attacker are different, and because the latter (which represents the attacker's behavior) is difficult to predict by the defender. First, we use duality theory and a generalized network flow model to devise an equivalent mixed-integer programming formulation, and develop its Benders decomposition. We extend this formulation with a multiobjective approach to account for several behaviors simultaneously. The computational effort to solve these models is considerable, as exemplified by our testing on a variety of cases for a mediumsized, notional network.

Securing a border under asymmetric information

“…Hidden sensors, or sensors using undisclosed technology, may improve but not alter . Following Salmerón , we refer to these as decoys and traps, respectively. Depending on which dominates a given checkpoint, we reference it as a decoy checkpoint or a trap checkpoint.…”

“…Consider the length of an s-t path given the arc lengths (10). Choosing (s, k ) initializes our construction of the right-hand side of (4) via arc length c sk in (10a).…”

“…Of particular relevance to our study, are interdiction models that capture uncertainty in characteristics of the system being interdicted, the opponent, or the effectiveness of interdiction actions [2,6,7,9]. Information asymmetries between the players [1,7,10] can lead to computationally challenging models, such as the model we consider in this article.…”

Two extended formulations for cardinality maximum flow network interdiction problem

“…These problems can further be divided into different classes based on for example, node or arc removal , complete or partial interdiction , single or multicommodity flow , single or multiobjective , deterministic or stochastic and randomized interdiction , and symmetry or asymmetry of information .…”

Effects of a Player's Awareness of Information Acquisition and Ability to Change Strategy in Attrition Games

“…The smuggler is eager to choose safe transportation routes for illegal drugs or other contraband and customs wants to intercept them by setting inspection points. These researchers include Mitchell and Bell [33], Caulkins et al [14], Washburn and Wood [48], Bakır [6], and Salmeron [42]. Washburn and Wood formulated a TPZS smuggling game as a mixed integer problem from a graph-theoretical point of view.…”