2017
DOI: 10.1016/j.eiar.2017.05.002
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Deciding over nature: Corruption and environmental impact assessments

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1

Citation Types

0
20
0
2

Year Published

2018
2018
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
8
1

Relationship

0
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 59 publications
(22 citation statements)
references
References 20 publications
0
20
0
2
Order By: Relevance
“…There are a number of relevant global auditing regimes in place, almost all operated by non government organisations (NGOs; some receive government agency funding) like Transparency International’s corruption index – seen as valuable though subject to a number of criticisms (see, for example, Baumann, 2017; Madlovics and Magyar, 2019). Auditing regimes are confined to particular spheres but in practice they interact as in cases where corruption affects environmental impact assessments (Williams and Dupuy, 2016). The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) has developed an array of standards including food safety, environmental and energy management for businesses.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There are a number of relevant global auditing regimes in place, almost all operated by non government organisations (NGOs; some receive government agency funding) like Transparency International’s corruption index – seen as valuable though subject to a number of criticisms (see, for example, Baumann, 2017; Madlovics and Magyar, 2019). Auditing regimes are confined to particular spheres but in practice they interact as in cases where corruption affects environmental impact assessments (Williams and Dupuy, 2016). The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) has developed an array of standards including food safety, environmental and energy management for businesses.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…72,73 Corruption and uneven power dynamics can also play a role. 28,74 Situations in which groups with a vested interest in development proceeding hold undue influence over the mitigation hierarchy process are commonplace in EIAs through which many NNL systems are implemented. 75 For example, in some countries, companies commissioning EIAs from consultants are permitted to withhold payment until the EIA is delivered, thus holding leverage over consultants to incentivize favorable EIA reports that underestimate negative biodiversity impacts and, thus, the degree of avoidance required.…”
Section: Project-scale Implementation and Compliance Challengesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…75 For example, in some countries, companies commissioning EIAs from consultants are permitted to withhold payment until the EIA is delivered, thus holding leverage over consultants to incentivize favorable EIA reports that underestimate negative biodiversity impacts and, thus, the degree of avoidance required. 74 Application of avoidance can also be suppressed by governments if they perceive strong geopolitical incentives to promote infrastructure development. For example, dam construction in the Brazilian Amazon cannot be reconciled with achieving NNL in biodiversity; 12,76,77 however, the government perceives access to hydroelectric energy to be a geopolitical priority that supersedes avoiding impacts to irreplaceable biodiversity.…”
Section: Project-scale Implementation and Compliance Challengesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Par exemple, il est plus aisé pour l'aménageur de s'engager sur des mesures de réduction que d'évitement et de compensation. (Williams et Dupuy, 2017). Ceci peut ensuite être déterminant sur le contenu et l'efficacité de l'étude d'impact (Cashmore et Axelsson, 2013 ;Cashmore et Richardson, 2013 ;Runhaar et al, 2013).…”
Section: Accompagner Quoi Et Pour Quoi ?unclassified