Decision analysis and coordination of two-stage supply chain considering cost information asymmetry of corporate social responsibility

Liu, Yong; Li, Jiao; Quan, Bing-ting; Yang, Jinbi

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.04.247

Cited by 65 publications

(41 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…Ma et al [54] studied the CSR coordination problem of the two-stage supply chain under the condition of asymmetric cost information, and proved that the two-part tariff contracts can realize the coordination of the supply chain with symmetric and asymmetric information, respectively. Liu et al [55] studied the impact of symmetry and asymmetry of CSR cost information on supply chain decision-making and coordination. Wu et al [56] studied the supply chain coordination problem with CSR investment, and compared and analyzed the impact of quantitative flexible contracts and wholesale price incentive contracts on the profits of member companies.…”

Section: Corporate Social Responsibility (Csr) and Corporate Donationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Closed-Loop Supply Chain Models Considering Government Subsidy and Corporate Social Responsibility Investment

2020

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In addition to pursuing profits, more and more international enterprises are beginning to pay attention to environmental sustainability and corporate social responsibility (CSR). How to effectively encourage enterprises to undertake more CSR and maintain the sustainable development of society has become an urgent task for managers and researchers. Under this background, this paper considers the recycling of used products for environmental sustainability and takes into account profit donation as a CSR investment. Aiming at the decision-making of single-cycle closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with a dominant retailer when considering government subsidies and CSR investment, and based on the Stackelberg Game analysis technology, we formulate three distinct donation (CSR investment) models; the centralized system’s donation model, the manufacturer’s donation model, and the retailer’s donation model, and by doing system comparisons and numerical examples to analyze the impact of government subsidy and CSR investment on new product pricing and waste product recovery from the perspectives of government, environment and CLSC system. The results show that government subsidy is not only conducive to expanding market demand and increasing waste recycling rates, but also to improving CSR investment levels. Under the two decentralized decision-making models, regardless of whether the dominant retailer makes CSR investment, she can always get more channel profits than the manufacturer. From the view of environmental, economic, and social perspectives, the manufacturer makes CSR investment a better choice, and at this time the government has the best effect of implementing subsidy. Finally, based on the principle of cost sharing, a CSR cost sharing contract which can realize the coordination of CLSC is designed to solve the channel conflict and optimize the decision-making. Counterintuitively, the dominant retailer can gain more profits when it bears more cost in the CSR cost sharing contract.

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Section: Corporate Social Responsibility (Csr) and Corporate Donationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Closed-Loop Supply Chain Models Considering Government Subsidy and Corporate Social Responsibility Investment

2020

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“…Under the supply chain environment, CSR is especially important to meet business needs [21]. That is because that CSR affects not only the purchase intention of consumer [7] but also the social reputations of firms [22,23]. Therefore, CSR has emerged frequently under supply chain environment.…”

Section: Csrmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing and coordination in a dual-channel supply chain with a socially responsible manufacturer

Shiyang

Zhou

2020

PLoS ONE

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This paper aims at designing coordination contract in a dual channel supply chain (DCSC) which consists of a socially responsible manufacturer and a retailer. We build stylized game models under both centralized and decentralized scenarios. Then, we identify the reason for supply chain inefficiency under decentralized scenario. Further, according to the manufacturer's corporate social responsibility (CSR) coefficient, we design two different contracts to achieve coordination. We find that with the impact of CSR, social welfare under centralized scenario is always higher than that under decentralized scenario. However, profit of the whole supply chain between the two scenarios has different relationship. More specifically, when CSR coefficient is relatively low, profit under centralized scenario is higher than that under decentralized scenario. When CSR coefficient is high, profit under centralized scenario is lower than that under decentralized scenario. Due to these two cases, we respectively design revenue sharing contract with franchise fee and wholesale price contract with franchise fee and government subsidy to achieve coordination. The result suggests that encouraging the manufacturer to bear CSR properly can reach a multi-win for social welfare, consumers and supply chain members through coordination contract. However, when CSR coefficient is higher than a certain threshold, conflict between supply chain members becomes irreconcilable which results in the retailer's resistance. In this condition, only through subsidy from government or philanthropic organization can supply chain members sustain their cooperation.

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“…Wang and He [40] derived incentive strategies for motivating the manufacturer to reveal their true private information of carbon-reduction efficiency to the product designer in a low-carbon supply chain with asymmetric information of carbon reduction efficiency. Liu et al [41] inquired into a corporate social responsibility-sensitive supply chain and devised a coordination mechanism for motivating the supplier to disclose the true corporate social responsibility cost information and realizing the supply chain coordination. Zhou et al [42] proposed a contract design which can achieve the channel coordination and information sharing under uncertain demand situations in a fresh agri-food supply chain.…”

Section: Contract Coordination In the Green Supply Chain Under Green mentioning

confidence: 99%

Contract Design for Enhancing Green Food Material Production Effort with Asymmetric Supply Cost Information

Zhu

2020

Sustainability

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In order to improve green performance and achieve sustainability goals, food companies see the need to adopt green supply chain management. However, ensuring a green supply is a tough task since food companies do not always have full information of their suppliers’ efforts in improving their green performance. This information asymmetry issue will lead the food producers to make poor decisions and cause a profit loss. Therefore, to fill this research gap, this study investigates a two-stage supply chain, which consists of one dominated food producer and a food supplier who has private knowledge of its green food material producing (GFMP) cost. To figure out how green performance is the major parameter that influences the decision-making of supply chain members under information asymmetry, this study first expands demand functions for both a food supplier and a producer, considering their influence on the green degree of the food products and associated consumer acceptance. It is found that under certain conditions, information sharing will improve the supplier’s green performance and increase the food producer’s profit. This study then presents the prerequisite of green cost information sharing by the food supplier. Furthermore, a newly designed menu of contracts, which combine the wholesale price contract and cost sharing contract, is proposed for the asymmetric information case to incentivize the food supplier to disclose the green effort information and improve the environmental and economic performance of the food supply chain. Numerical experiments are conducted through a case analysis to illustrate and validate the proposed models.

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Decision analysis and coordination of two-stage supply chain considering cost information asymmetry of corporate social responsibility

Cited by 65 publications

References 47 publications

Closed-Loop Supply Chain Models Considering Government Subsidy and Corporate Social Responsibility Investment

Closed-Loop Supply Chain Models Considering Government Subsidy and Corporate Social Responsibility Investment

Pricing and coordination in a dual-channel supply chain with a socially responsible manufacturer

Contract Design for Enhancing Green Food Material Production Effort with Asymmetric Supply Cost Information

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