Decision-Making Behaviour Evolution Among Pork Supply and Demand Subjects Under Normalisation of COVID-19 Prevention and Control: A Case Study in China

Abstract

Affected by the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), there were short-term uncertainties in China's live pig industry supply chain. Due to the insufficient supply of pork, the price of pork rose from 33.21 yuan/kg at the end of 2019 to 37.46 yuan/kg in mid-February and fell to 26.41 yuan/kg in mid-May. To restore pig supply and stabilise prices, China issued relevant policies. Given the current effective control of COVID-19 in China, this paper constructed an evolutionary game model of China's pork supply and demand stakeholders under normalisation of COVID-19 prevention and control, analysed the behavioural strategies of consumers, government, and pig farmers, used MATLAB software for data simulation, and expounded on the evolution path and the characteristic rule of tripartite decision-making behaviours. The results showed that government supervision costs, evaluation of government by consumers and pig farmers, government subsidies to pig farmers and consumers, and the proportion of stakeholder behaviours affected the formation of tripartite relationships. The results provide a useful reference for the government to formulate effective policies, increase pig supply, and stabilise pork prices.

Behavioral decision-making of government, agricultural product producers, and consumers on agricultural product quality and safety regulation in a digital environment

“…Teng et al ( 14 ) studied the evolutionary decision-making behavior of government, farmers, and consumers based on the perspective of agricultural product quality and safety. Ma et al ( 43 ) constructed a three-party evolutionary game model of consumers, government, and farmers in the context of COVID-19 prevention and control normalization. The results showed that the cost of government regulation, the evaluation of the government by consumers and pig farmers, the government’s subsidies to pig farmers and consumers, and the proportion of stakeholder behaviors affect the formation of the three-party relationship.…”

Regulating the product quality of COVID-19 antigen testing reagents: A tripartite evolutionary game analysis under China's legal framework

“…In the presence of limited government supervision, ADR manufacturers tend to produce low-quality products and seek leniency from inspection agencies when obtaining marketing licenses. Lack of government monitoring and medical device inspection may lead to low-quality ADRs that have not undergone rigorous medical-standard manufacture ( 15 ). Low-quality ADRs sold to customers as a result of unethical business tactics can lead to an abundance of erroneous diagnostic results (i.e., false negative results and false positive results).…”