Decision‐making in civil litigation: Effects of attorney credibility, evidence strength, and juror cognitive processing

Abstract

The current study examined the relationship between juror cognitive processing (measured by need for cognition [NFC]), attorney credibility, evidence strength, and civil litigation verdicts (liability, likelihood of causation, and compensatory damages). Participants (N = 446) viewed a videotaped mock civil trial in which the credibility of the attorneys and the strength of the plaintiff's evidence were manipulated. Plaintiff attorney credibility, defense attorney credibility, and strength of evidence interacted with one another for liability verdicts. In the strong evidence condition, the likelihood of a liable verdict was higher for a credible plaintiff attorney than a non‐credible plaintiff attorney when facing a non‐credible defense attorney. In the ambiguous evidence condition, the likelihood of a liable verdict was higher for a credible plaintiff attorney than a non‐credible plaintiff attorney when facing a credible defense attorney. Plaintiff attorney credibility, however, was found to be more influential on jurors’ decision‐making than case evidence for likelihood of causation and compensatory damage award decisions. Participants’ NFC also interacted with plaintiff attorney credibility. High NFC jurors were more influenced by a credible plaintiff attorney than low NFC jurors. Although these findings are counter to common findings in the NFC literature, they conform to a body of literature that supports the notion that jurors view attorney credibility as a piece of case evidence and not a peripheral cue as is often assumed. Thus, the findings indicate that attorneys do matter to the outcomes of cases. Policy and practice implications for attorneys and the courts are discussed.

How expert witnesses' counterfactuals influence causal and responsibility attributions of mock jurors and expert judges

“…For example, seniority and professional credentials, which are associated with credibility (Shapiro, Mixon, Jackson, & Shook, 2015), are likely to reduce jurors' level of scrutiny (Salerno, Bottoms, & Peter‐Hagene, 2017). The perceived expertise of the source (Parrott, Neal, Wilson, & Brodsky, 2015; Porter & Ten Brinke, 2009; Tadei, Finnilä, Reite, Antfolk, & Santtila, 2016; Wood, DeVault, Miller, Kammelmeier, & Summers, 2019), or the clarity (Leslie, Young, Valentine, & Gudjonsson, 2007) and perceived credibility of testimonies and reports might also influence the persuasiveness of counterfactual communication.…”