Decisions of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based on Recycling Effort and Differential Game

Song, Jingxiu; Bian, Yuan; Liu, Guangdong

doi:10.1155/2020/7493942

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 40 publications

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“…By considering two channels in CLSC, sensitivity analysis was performed to illustrate the effectiveness of e-commerce integration. Xu et al [35][36][37][38][39][40] constructs closed-loop supply chains under different conditions. Some of them use manufacturers to directly recycle WEEE, some use retailers to recycle WEEE, and the others introduce third-party recyclers.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

Quan-xi¹,

Zhang²,

Liu³

2021

Sustainability

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In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

Quan-xi¹,

Zhang²,

Liu³

2021

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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Dynamic Optimal Decision Making of Innovative Products’ Remanufacturing Supply Chain

Liu

Wang

2023

Processes

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In order to realize the recyclability of innovative product resources, we explored the optimal dynamic path of each decision variable in the remanufacturing supply chain and analyzed the impact of each decision variable on supply chain performance. Based on the Bass innovation diffusion model, we established a remanufacturing supply chain model in which a single manufacturer leads and a single retailer follows, and the retailer is responsible for recycling. The optimal wholesale price, retail price, and recovery effort path were obtained through optimal control theory. We also discussed the influence of different innovation coefficients and imitation coefficients on the overall long-term profit of each member in the supply chain, and at the same time, found the optimal market share of the product. The research results show that the larger the market innovation coefficient and the imitation coefficient are, the larger the overall long-term profit of the manufacturer and the greater the market share of the product, while the overall long-term profit of the retailer and the entire supply chain will increase first and then decrease; when the innovation coefficient and imitation coefficient are above a certain level, retailers will not enter the market. In a market with a small innovation coefficient and a large imitation coefficient, the overall long-term profits of retailers and supply chains will be higher. This study provides a theoretical basis for the decision making of the remanufacturing supply chain of innovative products in a dynamic environment, and also provides guidance for the practice of nodal enterprises in the supply chain.

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Decisions of Closed-Loop Supply Chain Based on Recycling Effort and Differential Game

Cited by 2 publications

References 40 publications

Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

Dynamic Optimal Decision Making of Innovative Products’ Remanufacturing Supply Chain

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