Decoding corruption in Brazilian construction multinationals

Abstract

PurposeThis study aims to investigate whether firms involved in a major corruption scandal, with broad ramifications across several emerging and advanced markets, design the content of their corporate codes of conduct to either improve corporate ethical standards and practices or merely manipulate the impression of stakeholders.Design/methodology/approachThis study adopts an impression management perspective. It uses content analysis techniques to examine the codes of conduct adopted by seven Brazilian engineering and construction multinationals accused of corruption. The analysis covered five major themes: (1) forms of corruption, (2) values or principles, (3) interested parties, (4) procedures and routines and (5) punitive action.FindingsThe study provides detailed evidence that the codes of conduct adopted by these firms are mere artifices that aimed at meeting legal requirements but do not target the relevant corporate audience involved in grand corruption. At best, such a code may impede petty and bureaucratic corruption.Originality/valueThis research contributes to improving the understanding of how Latin American multinationals adopted codes of conduct after a major scandal and how they failed—at least to some extent—to design codes complying with established corporate governance principles. It shows that management manipulated the impression of stakeholders by selectively adopting or omitting certain terms, examining or concealing various issues and addressing mainly petty crimes rather than grand corruption. It also identifies areas where Western ethical values conflict with established practices and cultural norms in Latin America.

Analysis of Multinational Builders’ Corruption Based on Evolutionary Game from the Perspective of International Reputation

“…In the case of Odebrecht Construction Company's corruption, the payment of fines and reporting of public officials involved in the scandal helped the company avoid punishment and participate in subsequent construction activities [10]. Similarly, in Brazil, authorities would selectively adopt and conceal problems with multinational construction companies [11]. These examples highlight the challenges and complexity of addressing international corruption.…”