Deconstructing compassionate conservation

Abstract

Compassionate conservation focuses on 4 tenets: first, do no harm; individuals matter; inclusivity of individual animals; and peaceful coexistence between humans and animals. Recently, compassionate conservation has been promoted as an alternative to conventional conservation philosophy. We believe examples presented by compassionate conservationists are deliberately or arbitrarily chosen to focus on mammals; inherently not compassionate; and offer ineffective conservation solutions. Compassionate conservation arbitrarily focuses on charismatic species, notably large predators and megaherbivores. The philosophy is not compassionate when it leaves invasive predators in the environment to cause harm to vastly more individuals of native species or uses the fear of harm by apex predators to terrorize mesopredators. Hindering the control of exotic species (megafauna, predators) in situ will not improve the conservation condition of the majority of biodiversity. The positions taken by so‐called compassionate conservationists on particular species and on conservation actions could be extended to hinder other forms of conservation, including translocations, conservation fencing, and fertility control. Animal welfare is incredibly important to conservation, but ironically compassionate conservation does not offer the best welfare outcomes to animals and is often ineffective in achieving conservation goals. Consequently, compassionate conservation may threaten public and governmental support for conservation because of the limited understanding of conservation problems by the general public.

Consequences Matter: Compassion in Conservation Means Caring for Individuals, Populations and Species

“…The concept of the Quality Adjusted Life Year (QALY) is used in many countries to assess the benefit to human well-being and life expectancy against demands on a limited budget [40]. However, as Hayward et al [6] pointed out, trade-offs such as these are not compatible with the extreme version of Compassionate Conservation advocated by Wallach et al Oomen et al drew attention to the potential for substantial costs to humans resulting from an extreme perspective on the moral salience of non-human sentience [31].…”

“…They showed that lethal control can plausibly lead to a net positive effect on individual wellbeing compared with taking no action. Similarly, Russell et al [26], Driscoll and Watson [27] and Hayward et al [6] pointed to lose-lose outcomes for welfare and conservation where lethal control of invasive species is eschewed. Gough island in the South Atlantic is a good example: nearly two million sea-bird chicks are currently predated annually by non-native invasive mice introduced by people, driving some endemic species to the brink of extinction [28].…”

“…They strive to minimise harm by attending diligently to welfare and by exploring alternatives to lethal control [2][3][4]. There has been a marked increase over the last 20 years in animal welfare science in conservation and wildlife management [5,6]. For example, since early eradication programs targeting invasive pests were thought not to be sufficiently informed by welfare science, considerable work has been done to assess the humaneness of different options [7].…”

Shooting pheasants for sport: What does the death of Cecil tell us?

“…Their interpretation of virtue ethics leads them to argue that it is always wrong to kill sentient vertebrates in the interests of conservation . This perspective has been challenged by Oommen et al () and by Hayward et al (), who argue it places too much emphasis on individuals over collectives (populations or species) and may also lead to poor outcomes for both welfare and conservation.…”

“…This control is ultimately based on a preference for ‘natural’ processes, and the definition of native is largely cultural (Macdonald et al, ). Some conservationists argue that conservation is premised on nativism, and that native species are of more value to their ecosystems than are non‐native species (discussed in Hayward et al, ). Without further qualification, this is probably over‐stating this case.…”