Deconstructing local ownership of security sector reform: A review of the literature

Security Sector Reform, Statebuilding and Local Ownership: Securing the State or its People?

“…Such structures could constitute the mechanisms that Benedix and Stanley (2008) suggest are required in order to ensure the multiplicity of security concerns and needs inform the reform process.…”

“…Too often local ownership is reduced to consultation, engagement after key decisions have been made, and involvement of only a few like-minded, state-level members of the security and political elite who accept the decisions reached previously by external actors (Baker 2010;Benedix and Stanley 2008;Caparini 2010;Heupel 2012;Krogstad 2013;Mobekk 2010;Sedra 2010a). This is despite a widespread understanding that SSR processes should be inclusive if they are to be effective UN 2008;OECD 2007).…”

“…Ignoring disparate voices in SSR programmes does not decrease the complexity of SSR and chances of failure; it merely disguises the complexity and fails to address aspects that might otherwise lead to success. The success of SSR depends upon recognising the complexity of the reform process and ensuring there are mechanisms in place that enable the voices of different actors across society to inform the process (see Benedix and Stanley 2008;Nathan 2007). Compromising sustainability and the democratic process in favour of quick-wins is therefore either short-sighted or imperialistically motivated, and likely to paradoxically prolong the presence of external actors (see Cubitt 2013;Narten 2009;Nathan 2007).…”

Security Sector Reform, Local Ownership and Community Engagement

“…Governments in post-conflict environments may lack the authority or credibility required to solicit public support for reform, if, for instance, they are widely perceived as having committed wartime atrocities (see Sedra 2010b). It is also widely perceived that the expertise required to develop, manage, implement and evaluate SSR programmes comes from the experience of having been engaged in SSR programmes before (which generally automatically excludes members of host nations), rather than expertise gained from experience in and knowledge of the country, including the conflict it has suffered (see Benedix and Stanley 2008). This could perhaps be better understood if the success rate of SSR programmes was less questionable (see Sedra 2010a; Zyke 2011, for instance).…”

“…The complexity of SSR cannot be resolved by ignoring disparate voices: the exact opposite must occur if SSR is to be successful. Mechanisms need to be created to enable the incorporation of the voices of different local actors in the SSR process (see Nathan 2007;Benedix and Stanley 2008). Compromising sustainability and the democratic process in favour of apparent quick-wins and neat solutions is either short-sighted or imperialistic in intent, unnecessarily and paradoxically prolonging the presence of external actors (see Cubitt 2013;Nathan 2007;Narten 2009).…”