Default Privilege and Bad Lots: Underconsideration and Explanatory Inference

Khalifa, Kareem

doi:10.1080/02698590903467135

Cited by 18 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…Many philosophers of science (Papineau, 1996;Chakravartty, 2008;Khalifa, 2010;Devitt, 2011;Ruhmkorff, 2011;Ruttkamp-Bloem, 2013;Wray, 2013;Doppelt, 2014;Mizrahi, 2016;Nickles, 2017) are interested in whether successful theories are true, in whether they are empirically adequate, and in whether the theoretical entities posited by them exist. This section explores what axiological realism says with respect to these issues, and argues that despite its name, axiological realism is a variant of scientific antirealism.…”

Section: Variants Of Scientific Antirealismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Critiques of Axiological Realism and Surrealism

Park

2019

Acta Anal

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Lyons's (2003Lyons's ( , 2018 axiological realism holds that science pursues true theories. I object that despite its name, it is a variant of scientific antirealism, and is susceptible to all the problems with scientific antirealism. Lyons (2003, 2018) also advances a variant of surrealism as an alternative to the realist explanation for success. I object that it does not give rise to understanding because it is an ad hoc explanans and because it gives a conditional explanation. Lyons might use axiological realism to account for the success of a theory. I object that some alternative axiological explanations are better than the axiological realist explanation, and that the axiological realist explanation is teleological. Finally, I argue that Putnam's realist position is more elegant than Lyons's.

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Section: Variants Of Scientific Antirealismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Critiques of Axiological Realism and Surrealism

Park

2019

Acta Anal

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“…Reliable scientific knowledge should not depend strongly on accidents, or at least on not accidents that lead us to misjudge how evidence supports our theories. Failure of imagination can lead to our not entertaining theories that are comparably good to the ones that we did entertain; such unconceived alternatives undermine scientific realism (van Fraassen, 1989, p. 143) (Sklar, 1985;Stanford, 2006;Roush, 2005;Wray, 2008;Khalifa, 2010;Pitts, 2016e). This problem is rendered systematic by the fact that, as shown in Bayesianism, scientific theory testing is comparative (Shimony, 1970;Earman, 1992;Sober, 2008;Pitts, 2013).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Kant, Schlick and Friedman on Space, Time and Gravity in Light of Three Lessons from Particle Physics

Pitts

2017

Erkenn

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Kantian philosophy of space, time and gravity is significantly affected in three ways by particle physics. First, particle physics deflects Schlick's General Relativity-based critique of synthetic a priori knowledge. Schlick argued that since geometry was not synthetic a priori, nothing was-a key step toward logical empiricism. Particle physics suggests a Kant-friendlier theory of space-time and gravity presumably approximating General Relativity arbitrarily well, massive spin-2 gravity, while retaining a flat space-time geometry that is indirectly observable at large distances. The theory's roots include Seeliger and Neumann in the 1890s and Einstein in 1917 as well as 1920s-30s physics. Such theories have seen renewed scientific attention since 2000 and especially since 2010 due to breakthroughs addressing early 1970s technical difficulties.Second, particle physics casts additional doubt on Friedman's constitutive a priori role for the principle of equivalence. Massive spin-2 gravity presumably should have nearly the same empirical content as General Relativity while differing radically on foundational issues. Empirical content even in General Relativity resides in partial differential equations, not in an additional principle identifying gravity and inertia.Third, Kant's apparent claim that Newton's results could be known a priori is undermined by an alternate gravitational equation. The modified theory has a smaller (Galilean) symmetry group than does Newton's. What Kant wanted from Newton's gravity is impossible due its large symmetry group, but is closer to achievable given the alternative theory.

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“…The antirealist critique is known by three names: 'the threat of the unknown hypothesis' (Forrest, 1994), 'the argument from a bad lot' (Psillos, 1999: 215), and 'the argument from underconsideration' (Wray, 2008;Khalifa, 2010;Wray, 2012;Mizrahi, 2013b). Suppose that scientists thought up a few rival theories and compared them.…”

Section: Similaritiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Section 4, I explicate how my criticism against the pessimistic induction differs from the criticism (Fahrbach 2011;Park, 2011a;Mizrahi, 2013a) that the pessimistic induction commits the fallacy of biased sample. In Section 5, I argue that my criticism against the pessimistic induction is on the same boat as the argument from underconsideration (van Fraassen, 1989;Ladyman et al, 1997;Khalifa, 2010;Wray, 2008;Wray, 2012).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Uniformity Principle vs. the Disuniformity Principle

Park

2016

Acta Anal

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The pessimistic induction is built upon the uniformity principle that the future resembles the past. In daily scientific activities, however, scientists sometimes rely on what I call the disuniformity principle that the future differs from the past. They do not give up their research projects despite the repeated failures. They believe that they will succeed although they failed repeatedly, and as a result they achieve what they intended to achieve. Given that the disuniformity principle is useful in certain cases in science, we might reasonably use it to infer that present theories are true unlike past theories. Hence, pessimists have the burden to show that our prediction about the fate of present theories is more likely to be true if we use the uniformity principle than if we use the disuniformity principle.

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Default Privilege and Bad Lots: Underconsideration and Explanatory Inference

Cited by 18 publications

References 25 publications

Critiques of Axiological Realism and Surrealism

Critiques of Axiological Realism and Surrealism

Kant, Schlick and Friedman on Space, Time and Gravity in Light of Three Lessons from Particle Physics

The Uniformity Principle vs. the Disuniformity Principle

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