Defending China’s National Image and ‘Defensive Soft Power’: the Case of Hong Kong’s ‘Umbrella Revolution’

Abstract

This study examines the pro-democracy protests of Hong Kong in 2014 and how the protests became sites for Beijing's representations of Chinese national image(s). It argues that 'defensive soft power' can be used to understand the process through which Beijing made such representations and projections. 'Defensive soft power', extending on Nye's soft power is operationally defined as the reactionary activities taken in response to actions that harm or potentially harm a country's national image. Based on an analysis of the data drawn from three mainland news media, several perceptions of China emerge -China as a victim; China as 'reasonable' power; and China as benign and tolerant leader in the China-Hong Kong relation. This research highlights the 'Umbrella Revolution' as an instance where 'defensive soft power' was used to (1) fend off negative national images and (2) project positive national images. Mapping out the process of national image defence will enable readers to better understand a sovereign state's strategies to defend attacks on and promote positive perceptions of its national image.

Othering as soft-power discursive practice: China Daily’s construction of Trump’s America in the 2016 presidential election

“…In both defensive denial and charm offensive, ‘China’ is the explicit object of such discursive constructions. Concerned with ‘telling China’s stories’, both strategies are defensive in nature (Cao, 2014: 181; Loh, 2017; Sun, 2015).…”

Hard, Soft, Smart? North Korea and Power: It’s All Relative

“…The notion of soft power within the Chinese context is, indeed, somewhat different from what is usually accepted within the Western sphere, as it incorporates the concept of subduing an enemy without having to fight (Wang and Lu 2008). So, some have suggested that China is using soft power in a defensive manner by making a conscious effort to engage with and refute attacks made on China's image, while at the same time ensuring that the press also runs "ambivalent" articles about China so as to give the impression that the coverage is balanced (Loh 2017). China has also been seen as yielding "negative" soft power: instead of using soft power as a foreign policy tool, Beijing is actually more concerned about domestic policies and regime legitimacy (Callahan 2015).…”

“…Ernest Wilson reunifies various strands of power, especially the hard and soft varieties, by defining smart power as "the capacity of an actor to combine elements of hard power and soft power in ways that are mutually reinforcing such that the actor's purposes are advanced effectively and efficiently" (2008,110). It then becomes imperative to consider more refined interpretations of soft power, and especially interpretations that depart from the view that all usage of soft power is "positive" and for the greater good, peace and harmony (Loh 2017). Recent works that consider soft power as defensive power, soft power as image shifting and soft power as niche diplomacy represent new articulations particularly helpful to the study of the North Korean case.…”

“…Thus, the "negative" side of soft power has not always been analyzed. But just like any policy, the soft power approach is not just a benign tool and the advent of communication techniques online means that it is now very difficult to hide a public protest or a political backlash against prying electronic eyes (Loh 2017).…”

“…These strategic narratives include political values, foreign policy goals and strong cultural elements. This brings us back to the concept of defensive soft power, and especially how North Korea operates similarly to China, which has been using elements of soft power to ensure national cohesion (Loh 2017). This also means that while the DPRK controls its soft power technique, it is more knowledgeable about the potential impact of foreign initiatives that bring soft power to a number of cultural and educational areas.…”