Defending democracy against technocracy and populism: Deliberative democracy's strengths and challenges

Abstract

one of the co-authors of this article, died before its final version could be published in Constellations. He was 65 years old and died on March 31, 2020, in his hometown Lüneburg, Germany. Rainer was an inspiring political theorist who influenced a number of younger scholars in particular with his writings on Reflexive Democracy and International Political Theory. His reconstructive approach in the tradition of Critical Theory was highly regarded for bridging the gap between political theory and the various empirical subdisciplines in the social sciences. Rainer will be remembered by many of the participants of the yearly Conference on Philosophy and Social Science in Prague for the charming wit of his critical comments in discussions and by the members of the editorial group of Constellations for the seriousness of his contributions for the journal. An obituary for Rainer (in German

Pragmatist democracy and the populist challenge

“…In contrast to recent contributions to the debate on populism and political reform, which advocate for more (Landemore 2020) or less (Brennan 2016) popular participation in political processes or deepened deliberation preceding political decision-making (Gaus, Landwehr & Schmalz-Bruns 2020), this article elaborates to what extent a democratic praxis focused on problem solving can provide a remedy to the populist challenge. For this purpose, it engages with John Dewey's democratic theory, which construes democratic politics as a public process to determine and negotiate socially relevant problems and politically acceptable solutions.…”

Inductive Risk and the Legitimacy of Non-Majoritarian Institutions

“…For instance, Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti describe technocracy as advancing an ‘unmediated conception of the common good’. There is an objective political truth or a science of the common good that technocrats (and, by extension, experts) have privileged access to (Bickerton and Accetti 2021, 3; Bellamy 2010; see also Caramani 2017; Gaus, Landwehr, and Schmalz-Bruns 2020; Urbinati 2014). A weaker version of the argument says only that experts are more likely to make conscientious and informed decisions about certain policies because they are free from the distorting incentives of majority rule (Bellamy 2010).…”

De-centring Populism: An Empirical Analysis of the Contingent Nature of Populist Discourses

“…This approach has been heavily influenced by normative debates about the quality of liberal democracy – its possible improvements and threats (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, 2013; see also Müller, 2016). The dominant view portrays populism in opposition to liberal democracy (Abts and Rumens, 2007; Caramani, 2017; Gaus et al, 2020; Müller, 2016), while other scholars argue that the relationship between democracy and populism cannot be determined a priori but should be subjected to empirical analysis on a case-by-case basis (Harmsen, 2010; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2019). Among the risks of the first position is the reinforcement of the view of populism as a ‘black box’ with a permanent essence and fixed effects on democracy or the EU.…”