Defending the Coherence of Contextualism

Abstract

According to a popular objection against epistemic contextualism, contextualists who endorse the factivity of knowledge, the principle of epistemic closure and the knowledge norm of assertion cannot coherently defend their theory without abandoning their response to skepticism. After examining and criticizing three responses to this objection, we offer our own solution. First, we question the assumption that contextualists ought to be interpreted as asserting the content of their theory. Second, we argue that contextualists need not hold that high epistemic standards govern contexts in which they defend their theory.

On the Knowability of Epistemic Contextualism: A Reply to M. Montminy and W. Skolits

“…w o l f g a n g f re i t a g demands only low-standard knowledge of EC, and Montminy and Skolits (2014) arrive at the view that stating a theory is not to assert it. My own response (2011, 2012, 2013b) takes a radically different course.…”

“…My critics reason as follows: “Qua ordinary speaker,” they say, “the contextualist S … will find herself in ordinary conversational contexts in which … S will accept some of [the] assertions and [knowledge] attributions” made in these contexts. “She will thus be committed to the truth of some empirical proposition p” and “it would be extremely odd for a contextualist to maintain that she does know H that p” (Montminy and Skolits 2014: 323–4).…”

“…Nor is she committed to the view that she does not have high-standard knowledge of some particular proposition p she believes, as this does not follow from (MEC) 18 . Montminy and Skolits themselves acknowledge this point when they say that “perhaps her contextualist point of view, narrowly understood as MEC, does not force her to make this concession [that she does not know H that p; W. F.]” (2014: 323). Yet they attempt to justify their thesis by adding that it would be “extremely odd” for a contextualist to claim possession of high-standard knowledge (presumably because outright denial of high-standard scepticism would make EC much less interesting for epistemology) 19 .…”

“…More specifically, Montminy and Skolits claim that epistemic contextualism is unknowable H due to the fact that (MEC) and all stronger versions of epistemic contextualism fall into the scope of high-standard scepticism. According to their view, (MEC) is an “empirical thesis” and “since MEC seems to be in the domain of propositions our ‘knowledge’ of which a radical sceptic could target, the contextualist cannot plausibly be credited with knowledge H of MEC” (Montminy and Skolits 2014: 323). Let us therefore assume that epistemic contextualism is indeed a proposition that falls into the scope of high-standard epistemic scepticism.…”

“…4“The problem can be avoided by rejecting the assumption that the contextualist is making assertions when she presents her view” (Montminy and Skolits 2014: 328). Thus, according to the authors, even if the knowledge norm for assertion should be correct, there is no form of pragmatic inconsistency in the contextualist's defence of her own thesis.…”