Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich

Nagel, Jennifer

doi:10.1111/phpr.12008

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…(2001) and much effort has been expended in attempting to explain why the findings do not bear heavily on IAE or why despite the results, IAE is sufficiently robust as an approach to withstand intuitional diversity. For some of these discussions, see Weatherson (2003), Williamson (2004, 2011), Liao (2008), Deutsch (2009, 2010), Grundmann (2010), Shieber (2010), Nagel (2012, 2013). However, responses have typically taken the findings of Weinberg et al .…”

Section: Intuitions and Philosophymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…3 There is currently an exchange between philosophers on the significance of these findings and its implications for philosophical methodology. For the current discussion, see (Nagel, 2012(Nagel, , 2013Stich, 2012). Despite these discussions and despite the influence that this paper has had on an entire field, to our knowledge, there has not been a replication attempt of Weinberg et al (2001) to date, where researchers present participants with identical scenarios as in the original paper in order to test the robustness of the findings.…”

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confidence: 99%

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On Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions: Failure of Replication

Seyedsayamdost¹

2014

Episteme

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(2001) and its implications for philosophical methodology in general and epistemology in specific. Despite the debates, however, to our knowledge, there has not been a replication attempt of the experiments of the original paper. We collected data from four different sources (two on-line and two in-person) to replicate the experiments. Despite several different data sets and in various cases larger sample sizes and hence greater power to detect differences, we failed to detect significant differences between the above-mentioned ethnic and socioeconomic groups. Our results suggest that epistemic intuitions are more robust across ethnic and socioeconomic groups than Weinberg et al. (2001) indicates.Given our data, we believe that the notion of differences in epistemic intuitions among different ethnic and socioeconomic groups that follows from Weinberg et al. (2001) needs to be corrected.

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Section: Intuitions and Philosophymentioning

confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

On Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions: Failure of Replication

Seyedsayamdost¹

2014

Episteme

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“…Hence, we regard our experimental findings as contributing to an overlap between philosophy and cognitive psychology. In contrast, we eschew experimental philosophy's negative program , according to which empirical data is invoked to cast doubt on or replace traditional philosophical methodology (see, e.g., Nagel , ). Just as empirical investigations may shed light on traditionally philosophical subject matters, traditional philosophy may shed light on empirical matters.…”

Section: The Contrast Effect and Theoretical Approaches To Explaining Itmentioning

confidence: 99%

Knowledge in and out of Contrast

Gerken

Beebe

2014

Nous

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We report and discuss the results of a series of experiments that address a contrast effect exhibited by folk judgments about knowledge ascriptions. The contrast effect, which was first reported by Schaffer and Knobe (2012), is an important aspect of our folk epistemology. However, there are competing theoretical accounts of it. We shed light on the various accounts by providing novel empirical data and theoretical considerations. Our key findings are, firstly, that belief ascriptions exhibit a similar contrast effect and, secondly, that the contrast effect is systematically sensitive to the content of what is in contrast. We argue that these data pose significant challenges to contrastivist accounts of the contrast effect. Furthermore, some of the data set provides, in conjunction with some non‐empirical epistemological arguments, some limited evidence for what we call a focal bias account of the data (Gerken 2012, 2013). According to the focal bias account, the contrast effects arise at least in part because epistemically relevant facts are not always adequately processed when they are presented in certain ways.

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“…For an example of how these strategies play out in the debate surrounding experimental philosophy, see the exchange betweenNagel (2012Nagel ( , 2013 andStich (2013).9 Exactly how to define 'intuition' is a topic about which there is limited clarity or agreement in the philosophical literature (for discussion, see, e.g.,Kuntz &Kuntz 2011 andWeinberg 2014). For the purposes of this paper's examination of the MoC, I'll simply use 'intuitions' to refer to case-specific…”

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confidence: 99%

Why the Method of Cases Doesn’t Work

Suhler

2019

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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In recent years, there has been increasing discussion of whether philosophy actually makes progress. This discussion has been prompted, in no small part, by the depth and persistence of disagreement among philosophers on virtually every major theoretical issue in the field. In this paper, I examine the role that the Method of Cases (MoC) -the widespread philosophical method of testing and revising theories by comparing their verdicts against our intuitions in particular cases -plays in creating and sustaining theoretical disagreements in philosophy. Drawing on work from psychology, I argue that there is a fundamental incompatibility between (a) the structure of the theories that philosophers seek to construct using the MoC and (b) the structure of the concepts on which our case-specific intuitions are based. This incompatibility renders MoC-based philosophical theorizing unable ever to succeed by the very standards of adequacy that it sets for itself. And this, in turn, helps to explain the depth and persistence of theoretical disagreements -and, in certain ways, the lack of progress -in the many areas of philosophy where the MoC plays an important role.

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Defending the Evidential Value of Epistemic Intuitions: A Reply to Stich

Cited by 7 publications

References 46 publications

On Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions: Failure of Replication

On Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions: Failure of Replication

Knowledge in and out of Contrast

Why the Method of Cases Doesn’t Work

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