Defending the Moral/Epistemic Parity

Abstract

Do irreducible moral and epistemic facts stand or fall together? In his critical engagement with Cuneo’s The Normative Web, Chris Heathwood maintains that they do not. Appealing to a version of the Open Question Argument, Heathwood argues that while reductionism in the moral domain is not feasible, it is so in the epistemic domain. Heathwood presents non-reductive realists with what appears to be a difficult choice: give up on either The Normative Web’s argument for non-reductive realism or the Open Question Argument. In this chapter, it is contended that non-reductive realists do not face this difficult choice. Central to the case is the claim that, while analyzing epistemic concepts in terms of descriptive ones has its attractions, it is considerably more challenging than Heathwood maintains. Some wider lessons are drawn by identifying the difficulties that face those who wish to defend a broadly reductive view of the epistemic domain.

Conceptions of Epistemic Value

“…In this way, moral realism and epistemic realism run "in parallel." Cuneo's work has generated a lot of work, with some authors defending the parallel (e.g., Bedke (2010), Case (2019), Cuneo and Kyriacou (2018), Das (2016Das ( , 2017, Rowland (2013Rowland ( , 2016) and others criticizing it (e.g., Cowie (2014Cowie ( , 2016, Olson (2018)). 13 Notice that falsity of extended normative pluralism is still consistent with views on which value is "incommensurable."…”

“…Specifically, Cuneo (2007) defended a version of moral realism by defending a version of epistemic realism and arguing that if epistemic realism were false, then so would be moral realism. In this way, moral realism and epistemic realism run “in parallel.” Cuneo's work has generated a lot of work, with some authors defending the parallel (e.g., Bedke 2010; Case 2019; Cuneo and Kyriacou 2018; Das 2016, 2017; Rowland 2013, 2016) and others criticizing it (e.g., Cowie 2014, 2016; Olson 2018).…”

Ontological Entanglement in the Normative Web

“…42 In allowing (1)-(6) to go through for sake of argument, it follows that I ignore (or presume tractable) various other parity-undermining arguments, such as that epistemic facts can be analyzed purely descriptively whereas moral facts can only be analyzed prescriptively, as Heathwood (2009) argues. The interested reader should see Cuneo and Kyriacou (2016) for a response to this line of objection. It also follows that I take no issue here with arguments from indispensability as a general kind.…”

‘Varieties of Skeptical Invariantism I & II’

“…26 26 See Putnam (1982), Kim (1988), Nagel (1997), Greco (2015), Cuneo and Kyriacou (2018) and Kyriacou (forthcoming‐b) for such skepticism. For an overview of metaepistemology, see Kyriacou (2016).…”