Defending the motivational theory of desire

Abstract

In this paper I offer a defense of the motivational theory of desire. According to the motivational view, a desire is basically a disposition to bring about the desire’s content. First, I argue that two rival views on the nature of desire, the evaluative theory and the deontic theory, fall prey to the problem of the death of desire and that, when one tries to develop a plausible version of these theories which is able to overcome this problem, one ends up with a view that is not relevantly different from the evaluative view. Second, I respond to some objections to the claim that motivations are sufficient for desire, namely, the Radioman objection and the objection that some motivational states like intentions and habits are not desires.

Emotional actions: A new approach

“…According to the motivational view, a desire is roughly a disposition to bring about its satisfaction. Elsewhere, I have defended this view from its main rivals (Pineda‐Oliva, 2021). Their dispositional nature makes desires states which can run unconsciously sometimes or such that the agent is at times not fully aware of them or cannot access them by introspection.…”