2012
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-31909-9_9
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Defense against Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification Attacks in Cognitive Radio Networks

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Cited by 22 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…The drawback is the requirement of a trusted authority capable of emulating a Primary User. Hyder et al [11] present an adaptive reputation-based clustering scheme which uses the partitioning around medoid clustering. Applying the same to a distributed system with less number of inputs available and without consistent reputation information is infeasible.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The drawback is the requirement of a trusted authority capable of emulating a Primary User. Hyder et al [11] present an adaptive reputation-based clustering scheme which uses the partitioning around medoid clustering. Applying the same to a distributed system with less number of inputs available and without consistent reputation information is infeasible.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The detection rate of the PUs and malicious users in the mobile CRN was improved. Hyder et al introduced a reputation‐based clustering algorithm to counter the various attacking strategies, without requiring a priori knowledge of the attacker distribution and complete identification of the malicious users. The error rate of the proposed clustering algorithm was reduced significantly.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Cooperative sensing improves sensitivity and robustness of spectrum sensing with respect to channel impairments and hidden terminal problem [3], but raises an important security issue by making the cognitive radio network vulnerable to spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attacks [7], [8]. Some malicious users (attackers) may flip their sensing results before they report them to the fusion center with the objective of either blocking transmission initiatives (by making idle channels appear busy to other users) or causing transmission failures (by making busy channels appear idle to other users).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%