Deference, respect and intensionality

Mahtani, Anna

doi:10.1007/s11098-016-0675-6

Cited by 6 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…Despite this natural reading, the principle of Reflection has come under considerable critical scrutiny (Mahtani 2016). The Sleeping Beauty problem, in particular, provides one instance where the principle of Reflection appears to be violated.…”

Section: Reflectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…To find the solution to the puzzle, we need only look more closely into the conditions under which Beauty expects to learn W . This is because it is well-known (see Mahtani 2016;Briggs 2009;Schervish et al 2004) that a rational agent's credences at t 0 should not reflect her credences at a successive time t 1 when the agent at t 0 should not 'trust' her later self at t 1 because either: 1. the agent expects to suffer memory loss between t 0 and t 1 , losing some relevant evidence; or 2. it is the case that both (a) at t 1 , the agent does not know that it is t 1 ; 14 and (b) learning that t 1 has arrived would give her new evidence, which would change her credences at t 1 .…”

Section: Reflectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Bayesian Beauty

Milano

2020

Erkenn

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The Sleeping Beauty problem has attracted considerable attention in the literature as a paradigmatic example of how self-locating uncertainty creates problems for the Bayesian principles of Conditionalization and Reflection. Furthermore, it is also thought to raise serious issues for diachronic Dutch Book arguments. I show that, contrary to what is commonly accepted, it is possible to represent the Sleeping Beauty problem within a standard Bayesian framework. Once the problem is correctly represented, the 'thirder' solution satisfies standard rationality principles, vindicating why it is not vulnerable to diachronic Dutch Book arguments. Moreover, the diachronic Dutch Books against the 'halfer' solutions fail to undermine the standard arguments for Conditionalization. The main upshot that emerges from my discussion is that the disagreement between different solutions does not challenge the applicability of Bayesian reasoning to centered settings, nor the commitment to Conditionalization, but is instead an instance of the familiar problem of choosing the priors. I am very grateful to Christian List, Anna Mahtani, Richard Bradley, Aron Vallinder, Bryan Roberts, and two anonymous referees for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper, as well as the audiences at the LSE Choice Group, ELP Konstanz, Edinburgh Graduate Epistemology Conference, CHPS at CU Boulder, the MCMP Logic Colloquium, and the participants in the Formal Epistemology and Decision Theory Workshop at Bristol.

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Section: Reflectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Reflectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bayesian Beauty

Milano

2020

Erkenn

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“…As I mentioned in section 1, Expert Deference is closely related to the OP Principle: indeed it follows from the generalized version of the OP Principle. As such, though Expert Deference appears so plausible, it faces a number of puzzling counterexamples (Elga A., ; Arntzenius, ; Bovens & Rabinowicz, ; Bronfman, ; Mahtani, ). I begin by constructing a typical counterexample using my scenario of the World's Smallest Lottery.…”

Section: The Reflection Principlementioning

confidence: 99%

“…This explains why it is that whether you are rationally required to defer to an agent can depend on how that agent is designated (Bronfman, ; Mahtani, ). For example, you consider Alice an expert and so are required to defer to her because you know that she has come to know some proposition that you don't know, and that under any designator that you might use to pick this proposition out (e.g.…”

Section: The Reflection Principlementioning

confidence: 99%

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Basic‐Know And Super‐Know

Mahtani

2017

Philos Phenomenol Research

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Sometimes a proposition is 'opaque' to an agent: (s)he doesn't know it, but (s)he does know something about how coming to know it should affect his or her credence function. It is tempting to assume that a rational agent's credence function coheres in a certain way with his or her knowledge of these opaque propositions, and I call this the 'Opaque Proposition Principle'. The principle is compelling but demonstrably false. I explain this incongruity by showing that the principle is ambiguous: the term 'know' as it appears in the principle can be interpreted in two different ways, as either basic-know or super-know. I use this distinction to construct a plausible version of the principle, and then to similarly construct plausible versions of the Reflection Principle and the Sure-Thing Principle.

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Rational updating at the crossroads

Milano

Perea²

2023

Economics and Philosophy

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In this paper we explore the absentminded driver problem using two different scenarios. In the first scenario we assume that the driver is capable of reasoning about his degree of absentmindedness before he hits the highway. This leads to a Savage-style model where the states are mutually exclusive and the act-state independence is in place. In the second we employ centred possibilities, by modelling the states (i.e. the events about which the driver is uncertain) as the possible final destinations indexed by a time period. The optimal probability we find for continuing at an exit is different from almost all papers in the literature. In this scenario, act-state independence is still violated, but states are mutually exclusive and the driver arrives at his optimal choice probability via Bayesian updating. We show that our solution is the only one guaranteeing immunity from sure loss via a Dutch strategy, and that – despite initial appearances – it is time consistent. This raises important implications for the rationality of commitment in such scenarios.

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Deference, respect and intensionality

Cited by 6 publications

References 21 publications

Bayesian Beauty

Bayesian Beauty

Basic‐Know And Super‐Know

Rational updating at the crossroads

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