Deferentialism

Daly, Chris; Liggins, David

doi:10.1007/s11098-010-9596-y

Cited by 18 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…As our discussion of the argument for the existence of hands demonstrates, we should not dismiss a philosophical theory just because it is inconsistent with one of our best theories from another discipline. (For further discussion, see Daly and Liggins (2011).) Although Blatti does not explicitly consider the objection we have presented, his article indicates a possible response for him to make.…”

Section: Chris Daly and David Liggins 606mentioning

confidence: 87%

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Animalism and Deferentialism

Daly¹,

Liggins²

2013

Dialectica

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Abstract. Animalism is the theory that we are animals: in other words, that each of us is numerically identical to an animal. An alternative theory maintains that we are not animals but that each of us is constituted by an animal. Call this alternative theory Lockeanism.Stephan Blatti (2012) offers to advance the debate between animalism and Lockeanism by providing a new argument for animalism. In this note, we present our own objection to Blatti's argument, and argue that Carl Gillett's earlier reply misses the fundamental problem.We also use Blatti's argument to illustrate a common methodological error, namely, uncritical deference to best theories from other disciplines.Animalism is the theory that we are animals: in other words, that each of us is numerically identical to an animal. An alternative theory maintains that we are not animals but that each of us is constituted by an animal. Call this alternative theory Lockeanism. Stephan Blatti (2012) offers to advance the debate between animalism and Lockeanism by providing a new argument for animalism.Carl Gillett (2013) replies to Blatti. In this note, we present our own objection to Blatti's argument, and argue that Gillett's reply misses the fundamental problem. We also use Blatti's argument to illustrate a common methodological error.Blatti's argument appeals to standard evolutionary theory. If animalism is false, then we are not animals, and none of our ancestors were animals either; but standard evolutionary theory says that our distant ancestors were animals; since 'the rejection of evolutionary theory is too high a price to pay' (Blatti 2012: 686), animalism is not false. To put the argument another way: standard evolutionary theory is true only if animalism is true; since we should not reject standard evolutionary theory, we should endorse animalism. Blatti calls this the Animal Ancestors Argument (AAA).According to Gillett (2013: 272), AAA relies on the following premise (which he labels '(2)'):(2) If you are not identical to an organism, then you are not evolved or a product of evolution. Gillett (2013: 273, 275-6) points out that many products of evolution are not animals: DNA and RNA molecules, cellular constituents, and superorganisms (such as the Portugese Man-of-War), which are made up of organisms. He concludes that premise (2) is false, and rejects AAA on this basis.

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Section: Chris Daly and David Liggins 606mentioning

confidence: 87%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Animalism and Deferentialism

Daly¹,

Liggins²

2013

Dialectica

Self Cite

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“…It is worth noting three things in response. First, following Daly and Liggins (2011), it is difficult to come up with reasons for denying anti-deferentialist methodological priority that do not ignore the distinction between non-philosophical considerations outright settling and merely informing philosophical debates. I suspect that at least some of the people who believe that anti-deferentialist methodological priority is too strong also believe that this view somehow entails a complete disregard for non-philosophical considerations, which is not the Most of the examples in Sect.…”

Section: Deferentialist Methodological Prioritymentioning

confidence: 99%

Semantic Relativism and Logical Implication

Tarasov

2020

Erkenn

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Semantic relativism is the view that the truth-value of some types of statements can vary depending on factors besides possible worlds and times, without any change in their propositional content. It has grown increasingly popular as a semantic theory of several types of statements, including statements that attribute knowledge of a proposition to a subject (knowledge attributions). The ways of knowing claim is the view that perception logically implies knowledge. In my “Semantic Relativism and Ways of Knowing” (2019) I argued that a relativist semantics for knowledge attributions is incompatible with the ways of knowing claim. I suggested that this incompatibility depends on some basic features of the logic of relativist semantics, and therefore can be shown to generalise beyond the discussion of knowledge attributions to semantic relativism more broadly. Here I make this generalisation. I demonstrate that for any proposition p expressed by a statement that does not have a relativist semantics, and for any proposition q expressed by a statement that does have a relativist semantics, p fails to logically imply q. I explain why this happens, discuss some of its philosophical consequences, and consider a way to modify relativist semantics to avoid it. I conclude that semantic relativism raises interesting philosophical questions that have gone largely unnoticed in discussions of this view until now.

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“…For criticisms of stronger readings of Moorean arguments, see Paseau (), Daly and Liggins (), and Sider (: §2).…”

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confidence: 99%

Against Fundamentality‐Based Metaphysics

Lipman

2016

Nous

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Metaphysical views typically draw some distinction between reality and appearance, endorsing realism about some subject matters and antirealism about others. There are different conceptions of how best to construe antirealist theories. A simple view has it that we are antirealists about a subject matter when we believe that this subject matter fails to obtain. This paper discusses an alternative view, which I will call the fundamentality‐based conception of antirealism. We are antirealists in this sense when we think that the relevant matter fails to be constitutive of fundamental reality. The following discussion will not rely on any particular understanding of fundamental reality, covering conceptions based on grounding, naturalness and truthmaking, to name three salient ones. This paper argues that there are serious issues with fundamentality‐based metaphysics. It will be argued that: (1) the fundamentality‐based approach shapes and restricts our realist and antirealist views in unsatisfying ways, (2) that it is unable to handle the conflicting facts that lie across the envisaged ‘layers’ of the metaphysically structured world, and (3) that the methodological reasons for adopting the fundamentality‐based approach fail. The paper will conclude with a diagnosis of the discussed issues, identifying a common source.

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Deferentialism

Cited by 18 publications

References 22 publications

Animalism and Deferentialism

Animalism and Deferentialism

Semantic Relativism and Logical Implication

Against Fundamentality‐Based Metaphysics

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